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Internet is an interconnection of independent Autonomous Systems (ASes). Most
of the large ASes are operated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which are clas-
sified into 3 tiers based on their size and interconnections. Most of the Internet
traffic is routed through the Internet core, represented by higher-tier ISPs. Be-
cause of the security flaws of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the presence of
one or more malicious ISPs among the higher-tier ISPs can lead to many security
concerns. Internet denial is when a malicious ISP blocks some or all the traffic
that belongs to a specific network. The impact of Internet denial can be very
critical. Network Address Translation (NAT) is used to design a solution that is
scalable. In the NAT-based solution, outgoing traffic is address-translated into a
non-blocked IP address in order to hide its identity. However, NAT limits end-to-
end connectivity, causing servers within the victim network to become unreach-
able by external users. Application-layer information is used to design solutions
for web and email server reachability behind NAT. NAT also limits peer-to-peer
xiii
(p2p) connectivity, preventing p2p applications from working properly. Existing
solutions for NAT traversal are used to bypass this limitation. The impact of
the proposed NAT-based solution on performance is negligibly small, and only a
single NAT traversal technique, namely relaying, causes significant impact on the
network performance.
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ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺨﻮﺍدﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدﺓ دﺍﺧﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ، ﻭﻣﺤﺪﻭدﻳﺔ ﺍﻻﺗﺼﺎﻝ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻼﻣﺮﻛﺰﻳﺔ )ﺍﻟﻨﺪ
ﻟﻠﻨﺪ( )P2P(. ﻳﺘﻢ دﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﻭﺍﻗﺘﺮﺍﺡ ﺣﻠﻮﻝ ﻟﻬﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﻛﻞ ﻭﺗﻘﻴﻴﻤﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ ﺍﻷدﺍﺀ ﻭﻗﺎﺑﻠﻴﺔ
ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺳﻊ، ﻭﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺍﻥ ﻣﻌﻈﻢ ﺍﻟﺤﻠﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺘﺮﺣﺔ ﺗﺴﺒﺐ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮﺍ ﺳﻠﺒﻴًﺎ ﺿﺌﻴﻞ ﺟﺪًﺍ.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of the Internet in the last decade has made it a very
popular communication means in today’s world. Many businesses have started
to depend heavily on the Internet to conduct their daily tasks. An Internet dis-
ruption would not only be detrimental to businesses, public organizations and
users, but it would also have catastrophic consequences on the economy. A report
by Business Roundtable [1] estimates that the global economic cost of a major
Internet disruption is approximately  250 billion. Therefore, Internet resilience
against such disruptions is very crucial. Design and implementation of solutions
against potential Internet threats, whether they are accidental or intentional, is
necessary to ensure the Internet robustness. This thesis tackles a very serious
type of Internet disruption, namely the intentional blocking of Internet access by
higher-tier service providers. This chapter introduces the idea of the targeted
problem, together with the motivation and objectives of this thesis.
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1.1 Internet Resilience
Many Internet major outages and disruptions took place during the last few
years. In 2008, for example, three separate incidents of major damage to subma-
rine optical cables caused Internet outage in Saudi Arabia and many countries in
the Middle East and Asia [2–4]. Although the Internet disruption of these inci-
dents seems regional, they have actually affected many businesses in other parts
of the world [5].
Internet disruptions can happen at three different levels: the physical level,
the routing level, and the application level. The damage of undersea cables falls
under at the physical level. On the other hand, disruptions that may happen
on the routing level include the accidental traffic blackholing by a small service
provider in 1997 [6], which caused a significant portion of the Internet traffic to
be dropped. Moreover, instances of some of the outages that can happen on the
application level include the cases that affected some of the major major services,
such as GMail [7] and Hotmail [8], as well as the Domain Name System (DNS)
outages that has blocked access to many services [9, 10].
Such incidents raise questions about the Internet resilience against not only
outages and misconfiguration, but also intentional attacks and denial of service.
The impact of such Internet disruptions is not limited to the Internet-dependent
businesses, but it also affects many other financial aspects. “An Internet meltdown
would result in reduced productivity and profits, falling stock prices, erosion of
consumer spending and potentially a liquidity crisis” [1].
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1.2 Internet Denial by Service Providers
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) form the backbone of the Internet. They
own large, worldwide networks to provide Internet connectivity to their customers.
However, looking closely at how ISPs are structured to form the Internet, it can
be seen that they have the most control over the Internet, at least in terms of
connectivity and reachability. Large and medium-sized ISPs, often called tier-1
and tier-2 ISPs, respectively, are closer to the Internet core, and therefore, they
carry most of the Internet traffic. The small and local ISPs, called tier-3 ISPs,
are limited to carrying only traffic that belongs to their networks.
Because higher-tier ISPs control how the Internet traffic is routed, the presence
of one or more malicious ISPs among them can lead to many security concerns.
Traffic can be monitored, critical data can be exfiltrated, and packets can be
modified. Even worse, traffic can be totally blocked from reaching the intended
destinations.
The problem addressed by the thesis is related to the case when a malicious
ISP, usually a tier-1 or tier-2 ISP, blocks some or all the traffic that belongs to a
specific network. The victim network, which may range from a single user to an
entire continent, will not be able to reach some portions of the Internet, specifically
the networks that are accessible through the malicious ISP. We assume that the
malicious ISP uses the Internet Protocol (IP) address to identify the source or
destination of a packet, and drops that packet if it is either originated from or
destined to the blocked victim network.
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This thesis tackles the problem of blocking Internet access by ISPs by dropping
traffic generated from or to be delivered to the victim network. The term Internet
Denial is used throughout the thesis to address this problem.
1.3 Research Motivation
The impact of Internet denial depends on many factors, such as the locations
and addresses of source and destination networks, the location and size of the
malicious ISP, and the routing policies of the intermediate networks. In general,
the malicious ISP has the capability to block access to networks it serves. In
addition, other networks may be blocked because the malicious ISP is in their
routing path. The worst case scenario could happen if one or more tier-1 networks
conducted an Internet denial, as this will cause the victim network to be unable
to reach most of the other networks on the Internet, causing a complete Internet
isolation.
The victim network can be a single host, an enterprise network, or an entire
country’s network. The latter case is the most critical. As discussed earlier, an
Internet outage could cause a stop to many sectors, especially with the increasing
dependence on Internet availability.
The Internet in Saudi Arabia may become a victim of such type of problem,
specially that none of the ISPs in Saudi Arabia is an international, higher-tier
ISP. Therefore, a solution to increase Internet resilience against Internet denial
at the routing level is very crucial to address. This thesis proposes such solution
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that can circumvent the problem.
1.4 Thesis Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a solution for the problem of
Internet denial at the routing level by higher-tier ISPs. The solution is meant
to provide the maximum possible Internet availability with minimum changes
in the network. The proposed solution is studied and investigated in terms of
connectivity and performance, showing its advantages and disadvantages.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
To achieve the thesis objectives, the contributions of this thesis can be sum-
marized as follows:
 Study the impact of Internet denial by higher-tier ISPs.
 Provide a solution that uses Network Address Translation (NAT), and ana-
lyze the related scalability issues.
 Evaluate the performance impact caused by the implementation of the pro-
posed NAT solution using simulation.
 Study the limitations of the solution, such as the lack of end-to-end connec-
tivity, and the unreachability of local services by external users; and provide
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solutions for some of the services affected by these limitations, namely web
servers, email servers, and peer-to-peer applications.
 Evaluate the proposed solutions for servers and p2p applications to measure
their impact on the network performance.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized into the following chapters. Chapter 1.6 starts with a
background about the Internet structure, the topology of ISPs, and the protocols
that connect the Internet together. In addition, the problem of Internet denial is
explored to see, based on the provided background, how serious and critical it is.
The potential implications of the problem are also studied.
Chapter 2.3.4 starts with an exploration of different approaches to solve the
Internet denial problem at the routing level. An approach that is based on Network
Address Translation (NAT) is chosen to build the proposed solution on. The
mechanisms of how the solution works, and how it is implemented, are described.
Furthermore, we will look into the scalability issues of the solution, and discuss
different possible design approaches. The performance of the solution is then
evaluated using simulations to see its impact on the network performance.
One limitation of the proposed solution is the unreachability of local servers
residing in the affected region, which is discussed in chapter 3.5. Solutions to the
most common application servers, namely Web and Email servers, are proposed.
Different scalability designs are also discussed to balance the load and improve
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the performance. Simulations are performed in order to evaluate the performance
impact on servers.
The following chapter, chapter 4.6, discusses another critical connectivity limi-
tation of the proposed solution. The solution prevents many peer-to-peer applica-
tions from establishing connections correctly. Therefore, a survey of the existing
NAT traversal techniques is presented, and the impact of the solution on peer-to-
peer applications, both on performance and connectivity, is discussed.
Chapter 5.5.4 presents a discussion of the complete proposed solution in terms
of connectivity, performance, and limitations. It also presents an example of
implementing the solution on the ISPs in Saudi Arabia.
The thesis finally concludes in chapter 6.2.3, where the overall picture of the
proposed solutions is summarized, with a list of potential improvements and un-
resolved issues as future work.
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CHAPTER 2
INTENTIONAL INTERNET
ACCESS DENIAL
In this chapter, the problem of Internet Denial is discussed in more details.
Some background on the Internet structure and connectivity is presented in order
to provide a better understanding of the likelihood and impact of this problem.
2.1 Internet Structure
2.1.1 Internet: A network of networks
The global Internet is a system of interconnections between a large number of
separate, heterogeneous networks. These networks use a unified set of standard
protocols to communicate between them. The Internet is a network of networks
that consists of millions of private and public, business, academic, and government
networks. Each of these networks is run and administrated independently, and
therefore, these networks are usually called Autonomous Systems.
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2.1.2 Autonomous Systems
An Autonomous System (AS) is a network of hosts, routers and IP prefixes
that run under a single administration, and have a single and clearly defined
external routing policy [11]. An AS may have different routing protocols and
policies within it, but it must have only a single policy when it interacts with
other ASes. ASes on the Internet are of different sizes; they range from a single
router to a cross-continent network. Most of the large ASes are owned by Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). An ISP’s network is ideally one AS, since the network
is under a single administrative entity. However, many ISPs have more than one
AS in their networks.
2.1.3 Internet Service Providers
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are companies that offer their customers
access to the Internet. An ISP connects to its customers using some data com-
munication technology, and provides them with the service of delivering their
Internet datagrams. All ISPs on the Internet are interconnected, either directly,
via physical links, or indirectly, via intermediate ISPs.
Interconnection Between ISPs
Before discussing the 3 tiers of ISPs, let us first look into how ISPs are inter-
connected. The two types of relationships between ISPs are Transit and Peering.
Transit interconnection is a provider-customer relationship. It is simply when
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an ISP sells dedicated access to its customer ISPs via private leased-line circuits.
The customer ISPs pay for the Internet access in this type of interconnection.
Peering, on the other hand, refers to a interconnection between two ISPs to
exchange traffic for the mutual benefit of both parties. Each ISP provides the other
ISP with access to its networks and customers’ networks. This interconnection
does not involve payments for the access service, and hence, it is sometimes called
“settlement-free peering” to reflect the fact of cost-free interconnection. There
are two types of peering, depending on the physical connections that are used:
private peering, where a point-to-point link is used to physically connect the two
ISPs, and public peering, where multiple ISPs are interconnected at an Internet
Exchange Point (IXP) using a shared switch fabric.
Classification of ISPs
ISPs are usually classified into 3 tiers. The classification can be based on
their size, their type of interconnections, or the type of services they provide and
customers they serve. Although there is no clear definition of the boundaries
of these classifications, the most common definition is based on how an ISP is
interconnected to other ISPs.
Tier-1 ISPs are networks that can reach every other network on the Internet
solely via peering, without purchasing transit or paying any settlements. Based
on this definition, tier-1 ISPs are likely to form a full-mesh, i.e., each tier-1 ISP
is interconnected to all other tier-1 ISPs. Tier-1 ISPs usually own large networks
that cover one or more continent.
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Figure 2.1: Organization of the three ISP tiers
Tier-2 ISPs are networks that peer with other ISPs, but still pay for transit
interconnections to reach some portions of the Internet. They usually peer with
other tier-2 ISPs, and purchase transit from one or more tier-1 ISP. Tier-2 ISPs
are smaller than tier-1 ISPs, as they mostly cover one or few countries.
Tier-3 ISP is a network that “solely purchases transit from other networks to
reach the Internet” [12]. Thus, tier-3 ISPs typically connect to one or more tier-2
and tier-1 ISP in order to reach the Internet. Tier-3 ISPs are relatively small,
covering a country or a metropolitan area of a country. Therefore, tier-3 ISPs
usually provide Internet service to end-users.
2.1.4 ISPs Topology
The classification of ISPs based on their interconnections results in forming a
hierarchy for the Internet. Figure 2.1 shows how ISPs are organized into three
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tiers. Tier-1 ISPs form the Internet core, tier-3 ISPs form the Internet edge,
and tier-2 ISPs are in between them. However, the number of ISPs world-wide
has rapidly increased; more interconnections are formed between them, and the
structure started to lose its hierarchical topology. Today’s Internet consists of
more than 30,000 interconnected AS [13]. Figure 2.2 shows a visualization of
these ASes, organized such that the AS with more interconnections are closer to
the center of the figure. It can be seen that a small portion of these networks
belong to higher-tier ISPs, representing the Internet core. The remaining ASes,
the ones closer to the Internet edge, belong to tier-3 ISPs and end-user networks.
2.1.5 Border Gateway Protocol: The Glue of the Internet
The Internet consists of extremely heterogeneous networks. These networks
use different routing protocols, and different physical networks. In order to com-
municate with each other, all of them use the same set of standard protocols,
the TCP/IP suite. These protocols include the network-layer Internet Protocol
(IP), the transport-layer Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Data-
gram Protocol (UDP), and a set of standard application-layer protocols, such as
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and Domain
Name System (DNS).
For two hosts to communicate with each other, they need to use the same
application– and transport–layer protocols. The networks between them should
use the IP as a network–layer protocol. Given this setup, the end systems can
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Figure 2.2: Visualization of Autonomous Systems on the Internet
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communicate. However, when there are many other hosts on the Internet, and
those hosts are on different networks, a routing protocol is needed to provide
reachability information for a given destination. The routing protocols that are
used within a network, such as Routing Information Protocol (RIP), and Open
Shortest Path First (OSPF), are called Interior Gateway Protocols. They are
only used to provide routing within an AS, and they normally try to optimize the
network performance.
When two ASes are interconnected, they use an Exterior Gateway Protocol.
The Internet uses Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) as the standard inter–AS rout-
ing protocol. All networks on the Internet use BGP to exchange routing informa-
tion between each other.
BGP maintains a table of IP subnets, also referred to as IP prefixes, together
with their reachability information over ASes. BGP is different than other routing
protocols as it does not view the network as hosts and routers. Rather, it sees the
Internet as one network of atomic ASes, as shown in figure 2.3. Because of the
business nature of ISP interconnections, BGP is a policy-based routing protocol;
it accepts, denies, and optimizes routing paths based on policy, not performance.
BGP provides each AS a means to collect reachability information from neigh-
boring ASes, determine the best paths to IP prefixes based on reachability infor-
mation and the predefined AS policy, and propagate reachability information to
all routers within the AS.
Establishing a BGP session between two ASes requires a direct interconnection
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Figure 2.3: BGP view of the Internet as a set of interconnected Autonomous
Systems
between them. BGP runs over TCP to achieve reliability. When two ASes are
connected via BGP, the complete routing table is exchanged once, then only route
changes are sent through update messages. Each AS performs the following steps:
1. Advertise the local IP prefixes to neighboring ASes
2. Obtain prefixes that are advertised by neighboring ASes
3. If there are more than one path to a given prefix, a selection process is
initiated to chose the best path.
4. Advertise the selected paths to neighboring ASes, except to the AS that
sent it.
Because BGP is policy-based, an AS can define policies to control which pre-
fixes are advertised, which neighboring ASes receive those advertisements, and
which incoming advertisements are accepted.
An AS may receive several advertisements for the same prefix. Hence, a path-
selection process is performed to select the best path. The selection process de-
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pends on the path length, policy, and other factors. Only the selected path is
advertised to neighbor ASes.
Each AS has a globally unique identifying number, called Autonomous System
Number (ASN). ASNs are assigned and managed by the Internet Assigned Num-
bers Authority (IANA) [14]. ASNs are used to identify the path to a prefix as a
sequence of ASes that the traffic will go through before reaching its destination.
Accordingly, received advertisements are concatenated with local ASN, and prop-
agated, AS by AS, to form the routing path. This path is used to forward the
traffic to the destination prefix. Table 2.1 shows an example of how BGP works
to advertise an IP prefix from one network to all the other networks.
2.1.6 BGP Security Issues
BGP suffers from many security weaknesses [15]. There are many vulnerabil-
ities in the design of BGP, as it was originally designed to communicate between
trusted parties. However, the growth of the Internet changed that trust model,
and security became a critical issue. There are many recent research efforts that
propose solutions to the BGP security weaknesses. However, none of the solution
is widely deployed in the Internet.
Some attacks on BGP only affect the neighbor router, some affect the complete
neighbor AS, and others have larger scale that can affect the whole Internet. For
example, Session Termination [15] attacks can close the BGP session between two
routers when the attacker inserts a message that closes the connection. Another
16
Table 2.1: Example of how BGP propagates reachability information throughout
the network
Network F starts by sending its IP prefix
123.45.0.0/16 to its neighbor ASes, C and E.
Networks C and E now have a path to the prefix
123.45.0.0/16. Since this is the only path, it is
selected as the best path. They propagate the
newly learned path to all their neighbor ASes
except to the source of that path, F .
Network C has learned a new path to reach F ,
through the route CEF . Since there are more
than one path, a best-path selection process is
run, and the first path, CF is selected. Sim-
ilarly, network E has learned the path ECF ,
but the selection process selects the first path,
EF . Therefore, no changes have been made in
C and E.
Network B has learned two paths to F . It se-
lects the best one, BCF for example, and prop-
agates it to its neighbors. Network D also prop-
agates the path it learned to its neighbors.
Network A has learned two paths to
123.45.0.0/16, ABCF and ADEF . It se-
lects the best path, ABCF in this case, and
propagates it to its neighbor AS, D. It does
not send that path to B because this is the
source of the selected path.
Network E has learned a third path, EBCF .
It runs the best-path selection process, which
selects EF again. Therefore, no changes are
made.
Network D receives the new path, DABCF . It
then runs the selection process to select the best
path, which results in selecting DEF . Hence,
no more changes are made.
The internetwork now is stable, and all net-
works have learned and selected the best paths
to reach the prefix 123.45.0.0/16.
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attack, Prefix Hijacking [16], happens when a BGP router advertises an IP prefix
originated from another AS, and claims that it is the originator. This attack can
affect all of the Internet traffic that is destined to that prefix, as it will go to the
attacker AS, which may blackhole all that traffic by dropping it.
One of the issues with BGP is the inability to control how traffic is routed
through ASes. The received prefix reachability paths can only be considered as
“promises”. There is no way to ensure that traffic will actually be routed through
these paths. Practically, routers may provide signaling paths (the list of ASes that
propagated the BGP update messages), which are not necessarily the same as the
forwarding paths (the list of ASes traversed by data packets) [17]. Moreover, many
networks use load–balancing and multihoming techniques to distribute traffic over
multiple links. Thus, the traffic may go through different paths than the advertised
ones, and may go through ASes that the traffic originator does not know about.
The way BGP is designed allow the network to control only which neighbor AS
will receive the packet, but not how that neighbor AS, or any other AS in the
remainder of the path, will handle that packet.
Although this issue does not affect the delivery of traffic, as it will reach the
destination on any path, it raises many security concerns. Packets may go through
ASes that the traffic originator is unaware of, as they do not appear in the AS path.
The presence of a malicious AS in any path to the destination, not necessarily
the best path, results in the potential risk of routing the packets through that
malicious AS.
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A malicious AS may monitor, record, or even modify packets that are routed
through it. It may also blackhole the traffic that belongs to a specific network,
i.e., drop all the packets originated from or destined to the victim network. It
can also deny providing routing services for that particular network, preventing
it from accessing many destinations, namely the ones that are reachable through
paths that go through the malicious AS.
2.2 Related Work
Before introducing the problem that this thesis addresses, it is important to
address the related work done in the area of Internet resilience against different
types of attacks.
Due to the growing importance of the Internet, much work has been done
that studies the Internet resilience against different types of outages, failures, and
attacks. Internet unavailability takes place due to either accidental or malicious
causes. Hardware and/or software failures, misconfiguration, and traffic conges-
tion are non-malicious activities that may cause Internet unavailability. Much
work has been done to address these issues in the physical, routing, and applica-
tion level [18–21].
Malicious activities that may cause Internet unavailability include denial of ser-
vice (DoS) attacks, security breaches, terrorist attacks, intended hardware failures,
and deliberate Internet denial by service providers. Most of the research that has
been done in this area targets DoS attacks and security breaches [22–25]. Fewer
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research efforts target terrorist attacks and intended hardware failures [26, 27].
The malicious act of Internet access denial by service providers has not been
researched thoroughly. The Internet denial can take place at the physical, routing,
or application layer. In this thesis, we introduce the problem of Internet denial at
the routing level by malicious service providers, and propose a solution to tackle
this problem.
2.3 Internet Denial by Malicious ISPs
2.3.1 What is Internet Denial
Most of the ASes that are close to the Internet core are owned by tier-1 and
tier-2 ISPs. The networks of those higher-tier ISPs are large, as they cover multiple
continents. Internet traffic, sent from a host on one network to a destination on
a different network, is likely to go through multiple ASes. One or more of these
ASes is a higher-tier ISP.
As shown in the discussion of the BGP security issues in section 2.1.6, traffic
may go through networks and ISPs that are not announced in the BGP paths. It
is not possible to determine the exact path of packets because each packet may
travel on a different route to the destination. Response packets, sent back from
the destination to the source, may also go through different paths than the paths
used by the request packets.
We define Internet denial as the process of filtering transit traffic to drop
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packets that belong a specific victim network. The ISP configures its network
to drop, or blackhole, some or all the traffic that is originated from or destined
to one or more IP prefixes. We assume that the ISP will use the network-layer
information, namely the source IP address and the destination IP address, to
determine if a packet belongs to the targeted network.
2.3.2 Identifying Packet Source and Destination
IP addresses are allocated as continues blocks of addresses. The Internet As-
signed Numbers Authority (IANA) manages the IP address space allocations glob-
ally [28]. It cooperates with a number of Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) to
assign IP address blocks to ISPs and other entities.
The mapping of IP addresses blocks to their owners is publicly available
through the WHOIS protocol [29], a lookup protocol used to query information
about specific Internet resources, such as IP address blocks and domain names.
These databases are maintained by the RIRs, and can be used to determine infor-
mation about the assignee of IP address blocks, such as the organization or ISP
name and their country. Some services provide reverse lookup; they show all the
IP address blocks that belong to the selected country [30].
This information can be used by malicious ISPs to determine which IP ad-
dress blocks belong to the targeted network, organization or country, and perform
Internet denial on these IP address blocks.
21
2.3.3 Motivations for Internet Denial
From a business point of view, an ISP that performs Internet denial on a net-
work is risking its reputation. ISPs are supposed to provide the promised service
of traffic routing without such filtering or denial. Hence, when the victim networks
detect and report the act of Internet denial, that ISP may lose its reputation, and
eventually its customers.
However, there are many other forces and motivations that may push an ISP
to perform Internet denial on an organization or a country. An attacker that
targets a specific organization can perform the attack at the ISP-level, by hacking
into the ISP’s network and reconfiguring it to block that targeted network.
Internet denial could also be driven by political motivations. Governments
may enforce their ISPs to block some services from a specific country or region.
Many large services and networks have been attacked recently for political mo-
tivations. Gmail, for example, had many recent attacks targeting email accounts
of Chinese human rights activists [31]. Twitter, a popular social network, has also
been attacked recently by hackers from Iran [32]. These type of attacks are driven
by political forces.
These reasons, and many others, can encourage ISPs to perform Internet denial
on a specific network. The potential risk and impact of Internet denial could be
critical. Therefore, solutions for this problem should be studied and deployed.
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2.3.4 Impact of Internet denial
The impact of Internet denial depends on the location, size and connection
topology of the malicious ISP. Lower-tier ISPs can only cause Internet denial if
they exist in the route of the traffic. For example, a server that is located behind
a malicious tier-3 ISP is not reachable by the victim network. Higher-tier ISPs,
on the other hand, may cause larger impact. A malicious tier-1 ISP, for example,
can block the victim network from accessing a large portion of the Internet and/or
being accessed from the rest of the Internet, causing Internet isolation.
Because tier-3 ISPs do not act as transit for other networks, they only carry
traffic that belongs to their networks. Therefore, a malicious tier-3 ISP can only
block access to its own network. Hence, the impact of that ISP is only limited to
a small set of hosts and services. Figure 2.4 shows a simplified model of the ISPs
on the Internet. All other networks except the malicious one are accessible by the
victim network, resulting in a very limited impact of Internet denial by a tier-3
ISP.
Malicious higher-tier ISPs can cause more impact as they can block not only
traffic that belongs to their networks, but also all other traffic that passes through
them as transit. A malicious tier-2 ISP, as shown in figure 2.5, blocks access to its
own network, and to all its customer ISPs’ networks. Moreover, it is also possible
that ISP 6 in figure 2.5 becomes unreachable if the path to reach it goes through
the malicious ISP. For example, if a packet is sent from the victim network to ISP
6, and it is sent through the path 3-1-2-4-6, ISP 4 will drop the packet, and ISP 6,
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Figure 2.4: The impact of malicious tier-3 ISPs is limited to their networks and
services
and all its customer networks, will become unreachable from the victim network.
Internet denial by tier-1 ISPs has the most critical impact. A malicious tier-1
can isolate the victim network and block it from accessing large portion of the
Internet. An example is shown in figure 2.6, where all the networks for ISPs 2, 4,
and 6, and their customer networks, are unreachable from the victim network.
Because of the critical impact that a malicious higher-tier ISPs can cause,
solutions to this problem are needed. The next chapter describes a solution based
on Network Address Translation (NAT).
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Figure 2.5: A malicious tier-2 ISP causes a large network to be unreachable
Figure 2.6: Malicious tier-1 ISP block a large number of networks causing Internet
isolation
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CHAPTER 3
NAT-BASED SOLUTION TO
INTERNET DENIAL
Before looking into the proposed NAT-based solution to the Internet denial
problem, we will take an overview of the different approaches to resolve this prob-
lem.
3.1 Solutions to Internet Denial
Internet denial by a malicious ISP happens when two conditions are met:
1. The traffic goes through the malicious ISP’s network.
2. The malicious ISP drops packets that carry that targeted source or destina-
tion IP addresses.
Hence, the Internet denial problem can be resolved by eliminating one or both
of these conditions. Two classes of solutions can be considered: solutions to
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control the traffic path, so that it does not pass through the malicious ISP; and
solutions to prevent traffic from being dropped at the malicious ISP by concealing
the traffic identity.
3.1.1 Control the Traffic Path
The first class of solutions depends on preventing the traffic from being sent
through the malicious ISP. Although BGP provides reachability information that
includes the AS-path, it does not allow a network to control the actual path of its
traffic. A network can only select which neighbor ASes will route its packets.
Controlling the outgoing and incoming traffic requires modifications or adjust-
ments of the routing protocols. Source Routing, which allows the traffic originator
to specify the path its traffic will travel through, is a solution to control the out-
going traffic so that it avoids the malicious ISP. However, the existing Internet
protocols do not implement this type of routing. Modification of BGP is needed
at all routers in the Internet to achieve this type of traffic control.
Quoitin et al. [33] proposed BGP Tuning, a set of techniques that controls
incoming traffic. BGP tuning uses some techniques to influence the path selection
process of remote ASes. Three techniques are presented: AS-Path prepending,
where the length of the advertised AS-Paths is reduced to present it as a shorter
path; prefix splitting, where the advertised IP prefix is disaggregated into a set of
smaller IP prefixes to lead remote routers into selecting it as the longest prefix
match; and the use of Community, where remote cooperating routers use the
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community field in the BGP advertisements to identify the preferred paths.
Virtual Peering, also proposed by Quoitin [34], is a technique to control in-
coming traffic by using multi-hop BGP sessions. Remote ASes establish virtual
peering tunnels to control the traffic destined to the local AS. This solution is not
scalable as it requires all remote ASes to implement virtual peering and establish
tunnels for all communications.
Virtual Transit, proposed by Alrefai [35], is a modification of virtual peer-
ing. The introduced difference is that remote ASes advertise the virtual-peering
tunnel reachability information to their neighbor ASes, allowing them to use the
same established tunnel to transmit traffic to the local AS. Virtual transit has
better scalability than virtual peering, as only a portion of Internet ASes need to
implement it.
3.1.2 Hide Traffic Identity
The other class of Internet denial solutions is based on hiding traffic identity
from the malicious ISP so that it does not identify the traffic’s origin or desti-
nation. These techniques use IP addresses that are different from the blocked
ones. Therefore, the malicious ISP will be mislead into routing the traffic without
filtering it.
IP Address Replacement
The first solution that comes to one’s mind is to change the IP addresses of
the blocked network into different ones. The victim network can just register an
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IP block and use it instead of its current one. This solution may work for some
time. However, the malicious ISP can easily detect that a new IP block is used
by the blocked network, and will simply block it again. Hence, this solution is not
robust.
Tunneling Protocols
Network-layer encapsulation and tunnels are other methods of hiding the iden-
tity. Traffic is carried through a tunnel created between the two tunnel endpoints.
Hence, packets are sent normally until they reach the first tunnel endpoint. Then,
each packet is optionally encrypted then encapsulated as payload into another
packet, then sent to the other tunnel endpoint. The intermediate routers will
only see the two tunnel ends as the source and destination addresses. Packets
then are decapsulated at the other end of the tunnel, and sent to their destina-
tion.
The simplest tunneling protocol is IP-in-IP [36], where the IP packet is en-
capsulated into another IP packet. Other tunneling protocols, such as Internet
Protocol Security (IPSec) [37] and Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [38],
provide more security and encapsulation features, such as encryption and the
encapsulation of different types of packets.
To implement tunneling as a solution to bypass Internet denial, at least two
cooperating networks are needed as the endpoints of the tunnel. One of them
should be located before the malicious network, and the other is located after
it, so that the tunnel is established through the malicious ISP. The performance
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degradation of using tunnels is relatively significant, because packet encapsula-
tion adds an overhead to each packet, increasing the throughput requirements.
Moreover, the use of encrypted tunneling protocols, such as IPSec, will add some
computational overhead on the endpoints of the tunnel for the encryption and
decryption operations. Although this solution is highly reliable once deployed, it
does not work if no cooperating networks are found before and after the malicious
ISP, such as the case of stub malicious networks. It also does not work when the
destination host is within the malicious network.
Anonymous Routing
One more technique of hiding the identity is the use of Anonymous Routing
protocols. Anonymous routing provides means to hide the content of the packet,
as well as the identities of the source and destination, from the routers that carry
the traffic.
Onion Routing, first proposed by Syverson et al. [39], is one of the most popu-
lar anonymous routing protocols. The source host encrypts the message multiple
times with different encryption public keys. Then it sends the encrypted mes-
sage through a number of onion routers (i.e., network nodes that support onion
routing). Each onion router decrypts one layer of the message, reads the routing
information attached with the decrypted layer, and sends the message to the next
onion router. When the packet reaches the last onion router, it decrypts the last
layer, then sends the message to its destination. Intermediate onion routers are
not aware of the content of the message, its original source or its final destination.
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Other anonymous routing protocols, such as Cashmere [40], Crowds [41] and
Hordes [42], are based on the same concept of Onion Routing, where messages are
repeatedly encrypted initially and then decrypted layer-by-layer at the routers.
Anonymous routing protocols can be used as a solution for the Internet denial
problem. They provide a reliable way of hiding the packet identity. However,
the performance degradation of implementing such solution is very high [39, 43].
The solution would require a number of routers on the Internet that support the
deployed anonymous routing protocol. In addition, a large cryptographic overhead
is added to each router. Moreover, the number of hops that the message would
traverse increases the end-to-end delay.
Network Address Translation
Network Address Translation (NAT) is a technique that allows a large number
of hosts to use a small set of IP addresses to communicate with other hosts on the
Internet. A NAT router separates the network into two subnetworks, a private
network, where the hosts are given private IP addresses; and the public network,
where the NAT router is connected to the Internet by its public IP address.
NAT can be used as an identity hiding technique, by using a set of non-blocked
IP addresses as the NAT’s external IP addresses. All traffic will carry these non-
blocked addresses when it is sent through the Internet.
The solution proposed in this thesis is NAT-based, where NAT is deployed at
the gateway-level of the network to hide the identity of traffic by replacing its
IP addresses. The next sections and chapters discuss this solution thoroughly,
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including NAT design and deployment, scalability and performance evaluation,
and solutions to the NAT consequent connectivity issues.
3.2 Network Address Translation
Internet was originally designed so that each entity, such as hosts and routers,
has a globally unique IP address. The protocol that has been used is IP version
4 (IPv4), which uses a 32-bit address space, providing up to 232 = 4, 294, 967, 296
unique IP addresses. Later, it was clear that this address space is being exhausted
at a faster rate that was not anticipated in the initial design of the protocol. Many
technologies have been adopted as solutions to this problem. A newer version of
the Internet Protocol, IPv6, was designed to be deployed instead of the current
IPv4. IPv6 uses a 128-bit address space, which provides 2128 ≈ 3.41038 unique
addresses. This address space is “large enough to have 155 billion IPv4 Internets
on every square millimeter of the Earth’s surface, including the oceans” [44]. The
deployment of IPv6 is, however, slow as IPv4 is still widely used nowadays. One
of the reasons for this delay is the extensive use of a short-term solution, namely
Network Address Translation (NAT).
3.2.1 What is NAT?
NAT is a technique that enables a number of hosts to use the same public
IP address to connect to the Internet. It was first proposed by Paul Francis [45]
as a temporary solution for the IPv4 address exhaustion problem. A typical
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NAT network consists of a private network, where hosts are assigned private IP
addresses, and the external, public network, through which the NAT router is
connected using a public IP address. The NAT router and the private network
behind it appear to the Internet as a single host, with a single public IP address.
When a packet is sent from a host within the private network to the Internet, the
NAT router translates the addresses on the packet header so that it replaces the
private IP address with its public IP address. Similarly, response packets coming
from the Internet to the private host are translated by replacing the destination
public IP address with the host’s private IP address.
Together with its main purpose of extending the IP address space, NAT also
provides a level of security for the private network by hiding its internal addressing
structure and topology.
IP Addressing in Private Networks
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has reserved three blocks
of IP addresses for the addressing of entities in NAT private networks [46]:
• 10.0.0.0 - 10.255.255.255
• 172.16.0.0 - 172.31.255.255
• 192.168.0.0 - 192.168.255.255
All packets going through the NAT router must be translated, and the private
IP addresses are replaced by the public IP address. Hence, packets on the public
Internet should never carry private IP addresses.
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3.2.2 Address Translation Process
NATs work on the basis of communication sessions, which are identified
uniquely by the combination of: the source IP address and port number, and the
destination IP address and port number. Together with the IP address transla-
tion, NAT also translates the source and destination ports for the transport-layer
protocols, User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP).
When a host behind NAT sends a packet to the Internet, the NAT device
intercepts the packet and replaces the source private IP address and port number
by a public IP address and port number. Subsequently, it remembers this mapping
by storing it in the NAT Table, and when an incoming packet is received with the
same public IP address and port number, it replaces them with the private IP
address and port number, and sends the packet into the private network.
Translation of Outgoing Requests
An example of how the NAT translation is done is shown in figure 3.1. The
NAT router has the public IP address 3.3.4.4, and the private hosts have the IP
addresses 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.2. The first host sends a packet destined to the server
8.8.9.9. The packet carries the source 10.0.0.1:543 and the destination 8.8.9.9:80
when it is sent from the host to the router. The NAT router then translates the
source information to the public IP address and an external port, 3.3.4.4:3000. An
entry is also added to the NAT table for future translations. This entry includes
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Figure 3.1: Outgoing packets sent through NAT are translated into public IP:port
private, public, and destination IP addresses and ports.
When the server receives the request, the packet will appear as if it is coming
from a host with the public IP address 3.3.4.4. Neither the server nor the routers
that carried the packet to its destination are aware of the existence of a private
network behind the NAT router that sent the packet. It only appears to them as
if the NAT router is the actual host that sent that request.
Any subsequent packet that is sent from the same host to the same destination,
or more specifically, from 10.0.0.1:543 to 8.8.9.9:80, is mapped to the same public
IP address and external port, 3.3.4.4:3000. The NAT router checks the NAT table
before translating the addresses to determine if this packet is part of an earlier
session that was mapped to a specific external IP and port. If an entry is found,
it uses the same information to map the packet, so that the destination receives
it as if it is coming from the same host and port. Otherwise, if no entry is found,
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the NAT router translates the packet to the public IP address and an available
port, then it adds a new entry to the NAT table with the translation information.
Mapping of Incoming Responses
When a response is sent from the server to the client behind NAT, it carries the
router’s public IP address and external port as the destination. When the NAT
router receives the response packet, it will lookup a matching entry in the NAT
table to determine which host in the private network is the correct destination of
the packet. Once the NAT entry is found, the packet’s destination is translated
into the host’s private IP address and port, then it is forwarded through the
private network. The example in figure 3.2 shows the response sent from the server
8.8.9.9:80. The packet carries the destination 3.3.4.4:3000, which corresponds to
the router’s IP and port. The NAT router finds the entry in the NAT table and
translates the destination of the packet to 10.0.0.1:543, then sends it to the private
host.
The importance of the NAT table lies mainly in the mapping of subsequent
traffic and responses. Without the NAT table, packets of the same stream might
be mapped to different external ports, and the NAT router would not be able to
properly handle any incoming packet.
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Figure 3.2: Incoming response packets received by NAT are translated into private
IP:port
3.3 NAT as a Solution to Internet Denial
NAT hides a complete private network behind a single public IP address. The
network appears to other entities on the Internet as a single host. Therefore, the
structure, addressing, and topology of the private network is undetectable.
NAT can be used as an identity hiding technique to bypass Internet denial.
The victim network uses NAT routers as gateways to connect to their ISPs, and
uses a set of non-blocked IP addresses as the NAT’s external public IP addresses.
These addresses are not part of the IP ranges registered to the blocked network;
they are obtained from a neighboring network. The outgoing packets, therefore,
will not be blocked by the malicious ISP, as they will not be recognized as part of
the blocked victim network.
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3.3.1 Deploying Gateway-Level NAT
Implementing the NAT solution requires setting the gateway routers to use
NAT to translate all traffic into the non-blocked public IP addresses. Once NAT
is enabled and configured properly, clients within the victim network can send
requests and receive responses. Even if traffic passes through the malicious ISP,
it will not be recognized as traffic that belongs to blocked networks, and the
malicious ISP will route it normally through its network.
3.3.2 Private Network Configuration
Although entities in the private network behind NAT are recommended to have
IP addresses from the reserved private address blocks, they can still work with
different IP address blocks if the NAT routers are configured properly. Therefore,
for the NAT solution of Internet denial, entities within the victim network, in-
cluding hosts and routers, do not need any modifications to adapt with the NAT
solution. The only modification needed is at the gateway routers. NAT can be
set in the existing gateway routers, or dedicated NAT routers can be used as a
layer between the private network and the gateway routers.
In the typical NAT usage, hosts and routers are assigned private IP addresses
from the reserved private IP blocks. However, in our solution, we will keep the
existing IP addressing without changes. NAT routers can be set such that they
recognize the internal IP address blocks as private addresses, and the translation
is done between the internal IP blocks and the external public IP addresses. The
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translation from one address space to another is also known as IP masquerading.
There are many advantages of keeping the same addresses. The NAT solution
would be transparent to the clients as they do not have to make any changes in
their networks. Moreover, local DNS servers do not have to update their records
with private IP addresses, since no changes are made internally. In addition
to that, keeping the same addresses would prevent addressing conflicts in case
there are existing NAT networks within the victim network, an issue many NAT
networks suffer from [47].
3.3.3 Local and Public DNS
Hosts within the private network will be able to access services in the public
Internet directly through NAT. The Domain Name System (DNS) lookups of
public domain names are done normally through the DNS servers in the public
network, as shown in figure 3.3. However, in order to lookup a domain name of a
host within the private network, the lookup should be done through a local DNS
server that is located in the private network, as shown in figure 3.4. This does not
require any changes or additions to the network, as the authoritative DNS servers
of local services are placed within the local network.
Therefore, existing DNS servers would be able to map services within the
private network, as well as the public Internet. No modifications of the DNS
servers are needed.
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Figure 3.3: DNS lookup for external servers are done through DNS servers in the
public Internet
Figure 3.4: DNS lookup for internal servers are done through DNS servers located
in the private network
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Figure 3.5: Initial design of the NAT solution, with a single NAT router mapping
all traffic to a public IP address
3.3.4 Design Scalability
Because the proposed NAT solution is meant to solve the Internet denial prob-
lem, the victim network can range from a small LAN to an entire country. There-
fore, scalability issues and limitations should be investigated.
Initially, we assume the use of a single router, as shown in figure 3.5. The NAT
router is used to connect to the Internet, and all the traffic is translated into the
public IP address 3.3.4.4.
Extending Mapping Space
The first scalability issue is the limited number of possible mappings. NAT
maps each session to a single external port. The tuple of source IP:Port and desti-
nation IP:Port is used to map subsequent traffic to the same external port. TCP
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Figure 3.6: Extended NAT solution design using a pool of public IP addresses
and UDP use 16-bit port numbers, providing 65,536 ports. Ports from 1 to 1023
are called the “well-known ports”, as they are reserved for specific applications by
the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and they should not be used
as source ports. That leaves 64,512 ports that are usable as source ports. Hence,
a NAT router can map up to 64,512 sessions for each public IP address at the
same time. If there are more connections coming to the router, it may not be able
to serve them as there are no more available ports.
This issue can be resolved by using a pool of public IP addresses instead of
using a single public IP address. Adding public IP addresses increases the available
ports exponentially, since every added address provides the complete port space
to be used for mapping. Extending the initial design example, figure 3.6 shows
the extended network where the NAT router is now using the IP pool 3.3.4.0/28,
which consists of 16 public IP addresses, from 3.3.4.0 to 3.3.4.15.
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Load Balancing
Other NAT scalability issues include memory, bandwidth, and processing re-
quirements. For each NAT mapping, an entry is added to the NAT table. Since
a router can map up to 64,512 sessions at the same time, that much NAT entries
are expected to be in the NAT table.
A NAT table entry requires about 160 bytes [48]. Therefore, a fully-utilized
NAT table with 64,512 entries would require a little less than 10 megabytes of
memory, which is much less than available memory in routers nowadays. Hence,
the growth of the NAT table is not an issue when a single public IP address is
used.
However, the use of pools of public IP addresses will significantly increase the
required memory. For example, the NAT table resulting from the full mapping
of a pool of 16 IP addresses would require 160 megabytes, which is considerably
high. Therefore, router memory might become a limitation on the design.
Moreover, the NAT router has a limited processor power such that it might
not be able to handle that much traffic. Bandwidth and processor limitations
need to be considered as well.
To resolve these issues, load-balancing can be used by adding more NAT
routers at the gateway level. Each NAT router handles a portion of the pri-
vate network, and has its own pool of IP addresses. This method provides large
scalability of the solution since more NAT routers can be added as needed.
The partitioning of the internal network can be done by the physical topology.
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Figure 3.7: Extended NAT design using load-balancing over a number of NAT
routers
The private network is partitioned into a number of subnetworks, and each sub-
network uses its own NAT router to translate traffic. For example, if this solution
is to be implemented on a country-level, the country’s network can be partitioned
by ISPs. Each ISP is a subnetwork that is connected to the International ISP
using one or more NAT routers, as shown in figure 3.7.
3.4 Performance Evaluation
NAT adds some extra operations that take place in the NAT routers, which
may effect the performance. We will evaluate the performance degradation, if any,
of deploying the NAT solution.
44
3.4.1 NAT Processing Delay
Extra Processing Added By NAT
Enabling NAT in a router introduces a computational overhead that, theo-
retically, affects performance. NAT performs a number of added operations on
packets. For each incoming packet, the NAT router changes the destination IP
address and port. Similarly, for each outgoing packet, the NAT router changes
the source IP address and port. The router also performs NAT table lookup to
find a matching entry, and if none is found, it adds a new entry. TCP packets
have a packet-checksum in their TCP header, which also needs to be recomputed.
However, many router vendors, such as CISCO, suggest that the extra delay
added by enabling NAT is very small and negligible [49] because routers are de-
signed to minimize the NAT computational overhead. NAT may even have zero
impact on performance, as some routers, such as Junipar’s SSG500 [50], are de-
signed using a session-based architecture where the router keeps track of complete
connection sessions and is aware of the packet’s transport-layer information.
Most popular network simulators, such as OPNET [51] and ns-2 [52], do not
consider NAT processing delay in their simulations [53]. In order to correctly
evaluate the performance of NAT, a correct delay model of NAT needs to be
implemented in the simulator.
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Related Work on Packet Processing Delay
Clark et al. [54] have studied the overhead of the Transmission Control Pro-
tocol (TCP). They measured the computational overhead done at the transport
layer, such as TCP checksum computation, and memory read and write accesses.
They concluded that the TCP overhead is very small, and it is not the source of
processing overhead. The overall overhead per packet does not exceed a fraction
of a millisecond.
That study was done in 1989. Network processors have significantly been
enhanced over the last two decades, and the measured TCP overhead would be
even smaller by now. NAT computational overhead is somehow similar to the TCP
overhead, as both are in the transport-layer, and they have similar computations,
such as the checksum calculation. Hence, it is possible to approximate the NAT
delay to the measured TCP overhead.
Ramaswamy et al. [53] have studied the network processing delay that packets
experience. They estimate that on a 1Gbps network, the processing delay of
complex packet modifications, including NAT, firewall, and IPSec encryption, is
1,000µs, as shown in table 3.1. They model a simplified network processor to
measure the end-to-end delay that a single packet experiences. They did not
consider the effect on the overall throughput as routers are designed to improve
performance by processing many packets in parallel using multi-core processors,
and the processing overhead would have a significant effect only on the end-to-end
delay of a single packet.
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Table 3.1: Network delay components, showing the processing delays as estimated
by Ramaswamy et al. [53]
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Negligibility of NAT Delay
Although the study performed by Ramaswamy [53] shows that processing delay
is not very small, we still can consider it negligible for the NAT-based Internet
denial solution for three reasons:
1. Ramaswamy’s measurements are set on a 1Gbps LAN, where a delay in the
order of microseconds is considered significant. In our solution, however, the
Internet delay, which ranges from tens to hundreds of milliseconds, is much
higher than the added processing delay. In the worst case, the added one or
two milliseconds has no much effect on the overall performance.
2. Network processors nowadays are designed to provide high level of paral-
lelism, using multi–core and pipelining technologies. As indicated by Ra-
maswamy, the added delay would only affect a packet’s end-to-end delay. A
flow of packets would not suffer from that much delay, since multiple packets
will be processed in parallel.
3. The measured processing delay includes the sum of many operations: NAT,
47
firewall, and IPSec. The computations that NAT requires are much smaller
than the more complex computations performed in IPSec encryption. Hence,
only a small portion of the measured 1000µs is due to NAT.
Therefore, the NAT processing delay is not expected to have any significant
impact on the performance of the network, as long as the same network resources
are available. This will be shown by performing simulations of NAT to evaluate
its performance impact.
3.4.2 Simulation of the NAT Solution
In order to evaluate the impact of implementing the proposed NAT solution
on the network, simulations are performed. The OPNET [51] network simulator
is used to perform these simulations.
The objective of the simulations is to compare the network performance before
and after implementing the NAT solution. The used performance metrics are the
end-to-end delay, the traffic throughput, and the packet drop rate. Different
applications are tested under different traffic loads.
Modeling of NAT Delay
NAT delay is added to the packets whenever NAT is enabled on the local
routers. The processing delay in OPNET is modeled in a simplified way. The
delay suffered by each packet is the reciprocal of the forwarding rate of the router.
For example, if a router model in OPNET has a forwarding rate of 100,000 packets
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Figure 3.8: G/D/c and G/D/1 queuing models.
per second, the processing delay of each packet would be 1/100, 000 = 10µs. The
single-packet processing delay of a real router may be higher, though. The OPNET
simplified model does not take parallel processing into account.
The network processor in a router can process multiple packets in parallel.
Some processors, such as Intel IXP2800 network processor [55], can process up
to 128 packets in parallel. Hence, a router can be modeled as a G/D/c queuing
system (arbitrary arrival rate, deterministic service rate), with a single queue and c
servers, as shown in the left side of figure 3.8. The number of servers, c, represents
the number of packets that the router can process in parallel. Assuming the service
time for each server is τ , OPNET simplifies this model by using a G/D/1 queuing
model, with a single server that can process packets c times faster, as shown in
the right side of figure 3.8. Hence, the service time is τ/c.
This model simplification is not correct for measuring the delay of a single
packet. The packet in the actual router will suffer a processing delay of τ , regard-
less of the parallelism that the router supports. The two models are equivalent
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only under the condition that the queue is not empty. In this case, all servers
in the G/D/c model are busy processing packets. Therefore, the throughput is c
packets per τ , which is similar to the throughput of the G/D/1. This means that
the simulation of processing delay in OPNET is correct only under the condition
that there is a sufficient amount of traffic to keep servers busy. Therefore, the
traffic bit rate used in the simulations should not be very low.
The delay is added to the service time of the single-server queuing system.
Therefore, the simulated NAT delay must be 1/c of the real NAT delay, in order
to take parallelism into consideration. For example, to simulate a NAT delay
of 500µs (0.5 ms) on a router that can process 32 parallel threads, a delay of
500/32 = 15.6µs is added to the simulation.
Based on Ramaswamy’s work [53], a packet processing delay of 1000µs is es-
timated on a router that runs NAT, firewall, and IPSec encryption protocol. Be-
cause NAT is less complex than the operations like firewall and IPSec, its delay
is represented only by a small portion of the total processing delay. In the worst
case, we select half of that processing delay, i.e., 500µs. For a router that processes
16 packets in parallel, the modeled delay should be 500/16 = 31.25µs. This delay
represents the worst case scenario when NAT is used. Therefore, real routers will
have better performance and less overhead than the simulated one.
The range of simulated NAT delay values is between 10µs and 250µs. In reality,
the range for real routers is between 10µs and 50µs. The remaining range, i.e.,
from 50µs to 250µs, does not reflect the real routers’ performance. It is simulated
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Figure 3.9: Simulated scenario to measure the effect of NAT delay on network
performance
only to see the effect of high processing delay on performance.
Simulated Scenario
The simulated scenario is shown in figure 3.9. It consists of two networks,
local and remote. Each network consists of a Local Area Network (LAN) and a
gateway router. NAT is enabled in the local network’s gateway router. An IP
cloud, representing the Internet, is connecting the two gateway routers.
Simulation Setup and Parameters
The local and remote networks are 100BaseT Fast Ethernet networks. Each
network has a number of connected hosts that will serve as clients and servers
for each application. The number of hosts on each network is set to 10. The
gateway routers are based on the generic router model in OPNET. It supports
many protocols, including BGP and NAT. Both routers are connected to the
central Internet cloud using DS–1 links, which provide a data rate of 1.544 Mbps.
Two applications are simulated: FTP, which runs over TCP; and Video Con-
ferencing, which runs over UDP. Each application is simulated under three traffic
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scenarios: low, medium, and high traffic. The low traffic scenario uses about 25%
of the available link’s bandwidth, which is about 380 kbps. The medium traffic
uses 50% of the bandwidth (about 770 kbps). The high traffic utilizes about 75%
of the bandwidth (about 1,200 kbps). These scenarios are selected to evaluate the
performance of NAT under different traffic loads.
Each simulation is run 5 times, and the average of the 5 results is taken. Perfor-
mance is evaluated over three measurements: end-to-end delay, traffic throughput,
and packet drop rate.
Simulation of End-to-end Delay
The three scenarios of traffic are simulated for both UDP (video conferencing)
and TCP (file transfer) to measure the end-to-end delay. End-to-end delay refers
to the amount of time that a packet takes to travel from the client to the server,
going through the local NAT router, the Internet cloud, and the remote gateway
router; and including the transmission times, the queuing delays, and the added
NAT delay.
The effect of NAT delay on the total end-to-end delay for UDP traffic can be
seen in figures 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12. The figure shows the end-to-end delay for low,
medium and high traffic; with and without NAT, versus the simulated NAT delay.
When NAT is not enabled, the NAT delay is not taken into consideration. Hence,
the end-to-end delay is constant for the NAT-disabled case. However, when NAT
is enabled, the delay packets suffer to reach the destination increases linearly.
The added NAT delay is suffered by every packet that passes through the
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Figure 3.10: End-to-end delay for low UDP traffic
Figure 3.11: End-to-end delay for medium UDP traffic
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Figure 3.12: End-to-end delay for high UDP traffic
router. If we model the router as a G/D/1 queuing system, the delay suffered by
an arriving packet is Nτ , where N is the number of packets in the system, and τ
is the processing time. An added NAT delay of ∆τ will result in increasing the
processing time to N(τ +∆τ) = Nτ +N∆τ . Hence, the increase of ∆τ causes a
linear increase of the processing time by N∆τ .
The increase of the end-to-end delay for UDP traffic is shown in figure 3.13.
The increase is computed as (DelayNAT −DelayNoNAT ). It represents the amount
of delay increase that is caused by the introduction of NAT. It is clearly noticed
that the increase of traffic causes large increase in the end-to-end delay. NAT
delay below 100µs have very negligible impact on the end-to-end delay. However,
as the NAT delay increases, its impact becomes more significant for higher traffic.
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Figure 3.13: Increase of end-to-end delay for UDP traffic
Figure 3.14 shows the relative increase with respect to the original end-to-end
delay. The relative increase is computed as (DelayNAT−DelayNoNAT )
DelayNoNAT
. We can see
that for small NAT delays, specifically below 100µs, the effect of NAT does not
exceed 0.1% of the total end-to-end delay. Larger values of the NAT delay cause
a relatively higher increase in the end-to-end delay. However, the maximum delay
in the highest NAT delay still does not exceed 0.4% of the total delay. We also
notice that the relative effect of NAT delay is lower when the traffic is high. This
is because higher traffic results in higher queuing delay, which eventually becomes
much more significant than the NAT delay. Hence, the relative effect of NAT
delay is lower.
The other application, file transfer over TCP, has a similar behavior of the
end-to-end delay. We can see in figures 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17 that the end-to-
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Figure 3.14: Relative increase of end-to-end delay for UDP traffic
end delay increases linearly with the increase of the simulated NAT delay. It is
noticed that the curves are not as smooth as the ones in the UDP simulations.
The reason is that the simulated application, FTP, does not use constant bit rate
as the video conferencing does. FTP is simulated as requests for file downloads or
uploads. Moreover, FTP runs over TCP, which requires the overhead of connection
establishment. In addition, TCP packets have larger header than UDP ones.
These factors increase the variance of TCP traffic in the simulation. The overall
trend of the end-to-end delay, however, is still linearly proportional to the NAT
delay.
Figure 3.18 shows the amount of increase caused by NAT. Again, lower NAT
delays have insignificant impact on the end-to-end delay, whereas higher NAT
delays have small effect. The relative increase of end-to-end delay, shown in
Figure 3.15: End-to-end delay for low TCP traffic
Figure 3.16: End-to-end delay for medium TCP traffic
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Figure 3.17: End-to-end delay for high TCP traffic
figure 3.19, is higher than the increase of UDP traffic. The above mentioned
variance factors cause this increase. However, the highest relative increase does
not exceed 0.45% of the end-to-end delay, and that increase occurs only when
the NAT delay is more than 200µs, which is an extremely high delay that NAT
routers do not really reach.
It can be concluded that NAT does not have any significant impact on the
end-to-end delay. The maximum increase of the end-to-end delay does not exceed
0.5% in the worst case when the NAT delay is higher than 200µs, which is an
extremely unrealistic scenario. For a router that, for example, can process 16
parallel packets, the modeled 200µs delay would represent a delay of 3.2ms on
the router. Such delay is very high, and all routers are much faster than that.
Therefore, in the reasonable range for the modeled NAT delay, which is between
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Figure 3.18: Increase of end-to-end delay for TCP traffic
Figure 3.19: Relative increase of end-to-end delay for TCP traffic
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10 and 50µs, NAT adds very small and negligible effect on the end-to-end delay.
Simulation of Traffic Throughput
The throughput is measured throughout the simulations in order to see the
impact of NAT on the amount of transmitted and received traffic. The same
simulation setup is used, where the three scenarios of 25%, 50% and 75% traffic
load are simulated, and the NAT delay is varied between 10 and 250µs.
Throughput is measured as the amount of application traffic sent and received
by the hosts per second. The simulation is set to measure the throughput at the
client side.
For the cases of low and medium traffic, NAT does not have any effect on
the throughput; both scenarios, with and without NAT, have exactly the same
measured throughput. In the case of high traffic, NAT only starts to affect the
throughput when the NAT delay is very high, i.e., more than 150µs. Figures 3.20
and 3.21 show the throughput of high UDP and TCP traffic, respectively. The
degradation of throughput is due to the high NAT delay which slows down the
processing of packets, and causes the router queue to be filled with waiting packets.
The relative decrease of throughput, which is computed as
(ThroughputNoNAT−ThroughputNAT )
ThroughputNoNAT
, is shown in figure 3.22. It can be noticed
that the degradation of throughput starts earlier in TCP traffic, as a NAT
delay of 150µs causes a small decrease in the throughput. The maximum
relative decrease is less than 0.3% of the total throughput, which is insignificant.
Nevertheless, in the realistic NAT delay range, the throughput is not affected at
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Figure 3.20: Throughput of high UDP traffic
Figure 3.21: Throughput of high TCP traffic
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Figure 3.22: Relative decrease of throughput for TCP and UDP traffic
all. We can conclude that NAT does not affect the throughput of the network
except at the extreme cases of high NAT delay, and even in this case, the
performance degradation is negligibly small.
Simulation of Packet Drop Rate
The reason of the throughput degradation is the large amount of NAT delay
that causes queuing of packets. New packets are dropped when the router queue
is full. The packet drop scenario is simulated in order to study the effect of NAT
on the amount of dropped traffic.
Dropped traffic is measured at the NAT router, where packets are actually
suffering the NAT and queuing delays. No packets are dropped in the cases of low
and medium traffic. High traffic, on the other hand, can cause traffic dropping,
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Figure 3.23: Packet drop rate for high UDP traffic
but only with high NAT delays. Figures ?? and 3.24 show the amount of dropped
packets for high UDP and TCP traffic. Low NAT delays do not affect the number
of dropped packets at all. However, the increase of the NAT delay beyond 100µs
results in an increase in the packet drop rate. It is also noticed that the TCP
drop rate is higher than that of UDP due to the overhead of TCP.
Figure 3.25 shows the relative increase of packet drop rate, computed as
(DropRateNAT−DropRateNoNAT )
DropRateNoNAT
. We see that NAT increases the packet drop rate only
when the modeled NAT delay is 150µs or more. The effect of NAT in this case
does not exceed 1.3% of the total dropped packets for TCP, and is less than 1% for
UDP. Such increase is considered small, and hence, the NAT effect on the packet
drop rate can also be considered negligible.
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Figure 3.24: Packet drop rate for high TCP traffic
Figure 3.25: Relative increase of packet drops for TCP and UDP traffic
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3.5 Conclusion
It was shown that NAT does not have any significant impact on the per-
formance of the network. The performance degradation that was measured in
simulations happens only when the NAT delay is set to a very large value. There-
fore, most existing NAT routers can perform the NAT operations without any
performance drawbacks.
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CHAPTER 4
SERVER REACHABILITY
BEHIND NAT
The use of NAT introduces a critical problem for servers. Because NAT routers
appear as single hosts to the Internet, NAT prevents certain end-to-end connec-
tivity scenarios between hosts. It allows internal clients to initiate connections to
external servers, but it does not allow external clients to reach internal servers. In
this chapter, this issue is discussed, and solutions for HTTP and SMTP servers
are proposed together with a performance evaluation of these solutions.
4.1 NAT Impact on Server Reachability
A server on the Internet is addressable using a tuple of its IP address and port.
Any client can reach such server using this tuple. Normally, servers have public
IP addresses, and thus, they are directly reachable. However, introducing NAT
changes the IP address of the server to a private IP address, and the server is only
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Figure 4.1: HTTP Request sent to a server with a public IP address
seen using the NAT router’s public IP address. Moreover, running multiple servers
for the same service, like HTTP servers, behind a single NAT router means that
these servers are sharing the public IP address. Therefore, they are all addressable
using the same tuple: NAT public IP address and the service port.
Figure 4.1 shows two HTTP servers with public IP addresses, connected to the
Internet through a router. A client sends an HTTP request to server A using its
public IP address (2.2.2.100) and HTTP port (80). The router uses the network-
layer information, i.e., the IP address, to forward the request to the correct server.
Since the server’s IP address is public and thus unique, there is no ambiguity as
to which server should receive the request, and the router would never send the
request to server B.
On the other hand, if the router in the previous example is replaced with a
NAT router, as shown in figure 4.2, the servers (A and B) and the router appear
as a single host to the Internet, with the NAT’s public IP address (3.3.3.100). The
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Figure 4.2: HTTP Request sent to a server behind NAT. The NAT router is
unable to identify what is the correct destination of the packet
IP addresses of the servers are now private, and any request to the servers would
have the NAT’s public IP as its destination IP address. An incoming request to
server A, for example, will have the destination tuple (3.3.3.100, 80). The request
reaches the router, and the router is confused about which server should receive
this request, because the NAT has no matching entry in the NAT table. The
request will be dropped by the router, unless the router is manually configured to
forward the traffic to a specific server.
4.2 Related Work
Running multiple servers with a single public IP address has been used in
many web-server scalability designs. Web clusters and distributed web servers,
are the most common examples of such design. Some approaches are used to
run a single website on multiple servers with a single IP address to achieve load
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Figure 4.3: The three steps of HTTP communication are: TCP connection, HTTP
request, HTTP response
balancing, while other approaches are used to run multiple websites on a single
server with one IP address to achieve higher utilization of hardware.
4.2.1 Multiple Websites on a Single Web Server
A very common technique to run multiple websites over a single server with
a single IP address is Virtual Hosting. This technique uses layer-7 information,
specifically HTTP request headers, to specify which site is the correct destination
for that request. To explain the technique further, we first explain how HTTP
works.
Any HTTP communication consists of three steps: the client initiates a TCP
connection, it then sends the HTTP request, and the server sends back the HTTP
response. Figure 4.3 shows an example of HTTP communication between a client
and an HTTP server.
An HTTP request consists of three parts:
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1. A request line which defines the method of the request, the address of the
requested resource, and the protocol version.
2. HTTP headers, meta-data that define characteristics of the data that is
requested.
3. A message body, used optionally to send data to the server.
The Host header is an important HTTP header field. It was first proposed
by John Franks [56] to allow a server with a single IP address to host multiple
websites. It was later standardized in HTTP version 1.1 as a mandatory header
field [57].
The Host header defines the host name of the destination website. For exam-
ple, a web server hosts two sites, www.alpha.com and www.beta.com, as shown in
figure 4.4. A client initiates a TCP connection, then sends the following HTTP
request:
GET /page.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.alpha.com
The web server receives the request, and by looking at the Host header, it can
decide which website is the requested one. This basically means that application-
layer information is used to identify the destination service.
The Virtual Hosting technique is one of the most popular hosting options
available today, due to its cost-efficiency as only one server, with one IP address,
is needed to host many web sites. It is implemented in most HTTP server appli-
cations, such as Apache [58] and Microsoft’s IIS [59].
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Figure 4.4: In virtual hosting, The web server uses the HTTP Host header to
determine which web site is the correct destination for the request
4.2.2 Multiple Web Servers With a Single IP Address
Cardellini et al. [60] have made a complete survey over the existing distributed
web-server systems. They classify these systems into two categories: web clusters,
where the server nodes are sharing the same IP address and the web cluster is seen
by the client as one host, and distributed web systems, where the IP addresses of
the server nodes are visible to the client. The first category of systems, i.e., web
clusters, is the one related to our problem, as it allows multiple servers to use a
single IP address.
The techniques researched in Cardellini’s work are based on having a number
of nodes that act as web servers. These nodes are connected to the Internet
through a router that is responsible for the request routing and dispatching. In
web clusters, the server nodes share the same public IP address, called Virtual
IP (VIP). This address is the public IP address of the router connecting the server
nodes to the Internet.
There are two types of routing mechanisms for web clusters: layer-4 routing
and layer-7 routing. In layer-4 routing, the router is content-blind, i.e., it is not
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aware of the application-layer information such as the requested page. Therefore,
all server nodes have the complete content of the website. On the other hand,
layer-7 routing is content-aware. Hence, it is possible to distribute the content
over different server nodes, where each node can serve a specific type of content.
This type of routing is more sophisticated, however, it provides more room for
content-distribution and load-balancing.
In layer-7 routing, requests are first accepted by the router, which can perform
layer-7 operations. This router is also called web switch. The web switch accepts
the TCP connection, receives the HTTP request, then decides which server node
should handle this request based on some dispatching policy. Cardellini discussed
two ways the web switch can handle the request to the selected node:
 TCP gateway: The web switch acts as an application-layer proxy to me-
diate the communication between the client and the server. This proxy
accepts client connections and maintains TCP persistent connections with
all the server nodes. When a request arrives on a client connection, the proxy
forwards the client request to the target server through the corresponding
TCP persistent connection. When the response arrives on the persistent
connection back from the server, the web switch forwards it to the client
through the other connection.
 TCP splicing: This technique aims to improve the TCP gateway technique
that is computationally expensive. Here, packet forwarding occurs at the
network-layer between the network interface driver and the TCP/IP stack,
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and is carried out directly by the operating system on the router and the
server node. Once the TCP connection between the client and the web
switch has been established and the persistent TCP connection between
the switch and the target server has been chosen, the two connections are
spliced together. IP packets are forwarded from one endpoint to the other
without having to cross the TCP layer up to the application layer on the
web switch. Once the client-to-server binding has been determined, the web
switch handles the subsequent packets by changing the IP and TCP packet
headers (IP addresses and checksum recalculations), so that both the client
and the target server can recognize these packets as destined to them.
Although the TCP gateway technique introduces larger computational over-
head, it has the advantage of not requiring any changes to be made in the server
nodes. In TCP splicing, the server nodes must be modified to be able to handle
spliced connections. However, TCP gateway can run transparently, and server
nodes do not need to be modified.
Cardellini’s research on web clusters is based on techniques to run a single
website over a number of servers with a single IP address. This is different than
our problem, where different websites are ran on different servers, but they all
share the same IP address. Therefore, the web clustering techniques do not fit
as solution to the servers-behind-NAT problem. However, one of the discussed
layer-7 routing techniques, namely the TCP gateway technique, will be utilized
to develop a solution to run servers behind NAT.
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Because the NAT router is unable to determine which server is the correct
destination for a received request, the solution is basically to define a method to
identify the destination server for a given request.
4.3 Proposed Solution for HTTP and SMTP
Servers
The deployment of the NAT-based solution for Internet denial results in pre-
venting external clients from accessing the services within the private network.
Therefore, we develop two solutions for HTTP and SMTP servers, since they are
the most commonly used services.
4.3.1 HTTP Servers Behind NAT
Server Reachability Issues
When the NAT router receives a request for a web server behind it, it is unable
to identify the correct destination for that request. There are many web servers
behind the NAT router; all of them are sharing the same address, i.e., the NAT
public IP address, and they also share the same TCP port, the standard HTTP
port, 80. There is no network- or transport-layer information that tells the NAT
router which server is the destination.
The problem, therefore, is that neither network-layer information nor
transport-layer information is usable to identify the correct destination of the
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Figure 4.5: Initial setup for the solution of HTTP servers behind NAT uses a web
switch for intermediate request forwarding
HTTP request. However, we have seen that application-layer information, namely
the HTTP Host header, can be used to map requests to their destination web-
sites. Hence, the solution we propose is based on using a similar concept, but on
a server-level mapping, rather than a website-level mapping.
Solution Setup
The initial setup for the proposed solution, as shown in figure 4.5, includes
the NAT router, connected to the Internet with a public IP address, a number
of web servers in the NAT’s private network, and a client that is connected to
the Internet and is attempting to access one of the web servers behind the NAT
router. There is also a DNS system consisting of the public DNS servers that the
client uses to determine the IP address of the servers, which is basically the NAT’s
public IP address; and the private DNS servers that are used by the clients within
the private network, as discussed earlier in section 3.3.3.
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Use of Web Switch
A web switch is used to accept HTTP request. It can either replace the NAT
router, acting as both NAT router and web switch, or the NAT router can just
forward all traffic destined to port 80 to the web switch behind it.
Public DNS servers must be updated with the new IP addresses. In this
case, the NAT’s public IP address is used for all servers. Hence, entries in the
public DNS servers are updated with the NAT’s public IP, which we assume is
not blocked by the malicious ISPs. The clients will use the public DNS servers to
resolve the domain names of the HTTP servers to the NAT’s public IP address.
The management of IP addresses will be discussed later in this chapter.
Identifying the Correct Destination
After resolving the server’s name and getting the IP address, the client initiates
a TCP connection to the HTTP port, 80, of that IP address. The web switch
accepts the connection and receives the HTTP request. Then, the web switch
reads the Host header from the received request, and uses the internal DNS servers
to resolve the host name into an IP address. This IP address, corresponding to
the private address of the correct destination server of the request, is directly
accessible by the web switch since the switch is part of the private network.
Now, the web switch has identified the correct web server for that HTTP
request. The next step is to forward the HTTP request to that server. The
proposed technique to perform that is to combine TCP gateway [60] with NAT
76
tables to provide a transport-layer forwarding of traffic.
Forwarding Requests to the Server
After the web switch receives the HTTP request and identifies the intended
web server, an entry is added to a special NAT table that maps the client’s address
tuple (client’s IP address and source port) to the server’s address tuple (server’s
private IP address and destination port, 80 in this case). This table entry is used
to forward subsequent traffic between the client and the web server until the end
of the HTTP session. Similar to the usual NAT tables, the entries are deleted
after some timeout period, or at the disconnection of TCP connection using a
packet with the FIN flag.
Example of Accessing a Web Server Behind NAT
To illustrate how the process takes place, figure 4.6 shows an example of a
request sent to the server www.alpha.com behind the NAT router. The client
sends the request to the NAT’s public IP address, 3.3.4.4. The web switch will
first accept the TCP connection, start receiving the HTTP request until it receives
the Host header. The request can be sent in more than one packet, therefore, the
router does not need to wait until the complete request is sent; it can start finding
the correct server once the Host header is received.
Finding the correct server can be done by performing a DNS lookup in the
internal DNS server within the NAT. This server should allow resolving all local
domain names into the corresponding private IP addresses. Once the server’s IP
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Figure 4.6: Example of using the HTTP Host header to access a server behind
NAT
is found, 10.10.10.1 in this example, the NAT router adds an entry in its table.
The table entry contains the client’s IP address and port (5.5.5.1:2000), and the
server’s private IP address and port (10.10.10.1:80). This entry is used to map
subsequent traffic, both request and responses, to the corresponding client and
server.
After finding the server and adding an entry to the mapping NAT table, the
web switch can now send the request to the server. The packets of the request
need to be address-translated, by replacing the destination IP address, which
originally was the NAT’s public IP address (3.3.4.4), with the private IP address
of the server (10.10.10.1). The responses sent from the server to the client are also
translated, replacing the server’s source IP address (10.10.10.1) with the NAT’s
public IP address (3.3.4.4). This is very similar to the typical way NAT works. It
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can be thought of as reversed NAT, where the traffic is initiated outside the NAT
and destined to hosts within the NAT.
The advantage of using this technique is that no modifications are made to
the servers within the NAT. Hence, using this technique together with the NAT
solution for Internet denial would be transparent from the servers. Adding the
NAT layer between the private network and the public Internet does not affect
most of the web servers within the private network.
Some web servers, namely HTTPS servers, will still be unreachable even when
the proposed technique is used. The reason is that HTTPS runs the HTTP
protocol over an encryption presentation layer, which causes all application-layer
information to be encrypted before transmission. Therefore, the web switch would
not be able to read layer-7 information that is needed to determine the intended
server, and the server is, hence, unreachable.
Design Scalability
Because the solution can be used for very large networks with high incoming
traffic, its design should be scalable to handle such load. The web switch is the
bottleneck of this solution. Hence, better scalable design is needed.
One approach is to use load–balancing. Incoming requests are distributed
equally over a number of web switches that are interconnected with the gateway
NAT router. Each web switch uses the described technique to forward incoming
HTTP requests to their intended destination servers. This design is shown in
figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Incoming request are load-balanced over a number of web switches to
increase scalability
When a request is received by the NAT router, it first checks its NAT table
to see if this request has already been mapped to one of the web switches. If no
mapping is found, the NAT router selects one of the web switches to handle this
request, adds an entry to its NAT table to map the connection with that switch,
and then forwards the packets to the selected web switch. The processing done at
this level is only layer-4 processing, no application-layer data are processed yet.
The selected web switch accepts the client’s request, and performs the de-
scribed technique of finding the correct server using layer-7 information. It then
forwards the request to the intended server after adding an entry on its application-
layer NAT table.
The objective of the NAT table at the NAT router is to map web switches to
incoming packets. Subsequent packets from the same client destined to the same
server should all be processed by the same web switch. Hence, the NAT table is
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Figure 4.8: DNS is used to distribute the load over web switches
used to keep track of this mapping.
On the web switch, the table is used to map packets of the same connection
together. Once the server is located using layer-7 information, all subsequent
packets are forwarded directly to the web server, and all responses are forwarded
directly to the client.
The other approach of load-balancing the incoming traffic is to utilize DNS.
Entries in the DNS can have more than one IP address. Hence, clients will use
different IP addresses to connect to the same server. By placing a number of web
switches at the gateway level, each with a different IP, incoming traffic will be
balanced over the different web switches. Figure 4.8 shows the topology used to
implement this approach.
It is possible to combine both approaches to maximize scalability. A number
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of NAT routers can be used at the gateway level, each with a different IP address.
These IP addresses are all used in the DNS for load-balancing. Each NAT router
is connected to a number of web switches that will process layer-7 information and
forward the requests to the intended destination servers. This way, load-balancing
is performed at both gateway level and web switch level.
4.3.2 SMTP Servers Behind NAT
SMTP: How It Works?
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is the standard protocol that is used
to deliver email messages on the Internet [61]. The SMTP email system is formed
of email servers, client agents, and the email protocol, SMTP. Email servers allow
users to connect to them through client agents in order to send and receive emails.
The servers keep incoming email messages in the users’ mailboxes so that users
can retrieve them later using the client agent application. Outgoing messages
are sent from the client agent to the local email server, and then from the local
server to the destination email server where that server stores these messages in
the recipient’s mailbox. SMTP is used for the exchange of messages between mail
servers, and for sending email from the client agent to the email server. Figure 4.9
shows how SMTP is used to deliver email messages from the user agent to the
destination server. The email message is first sent from the user agent to the
local email server using SMTP. The server, then, uses SMTP to deliver the email
to the destination server, beta.com. Once delivered, the client can retrieve the
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Figure 4.9: SMTP protocol is used to deliver messages to email server
email message using email access protocols, such as Post Office Protocol (POP)
or Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP).
An email address is written in the form account@domain, which consists of two
parts: the account name, which specifies the destination user of the message; and
the domain name, which specifies the server that maintains that user’s account.
When a mail server receives an email message, it looks at the recepient’s email
address to determine the destination domain name. It then uses DNS to determine
the IP address of the mail exchange (MX), the email server that handles SMTP
services for that domain name. DNS has a special entry type called MX, which is
designated for mail exchanges. After the server finds the destination IP address,
it sends the email message to it using the SMTP protocol.
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Solution Setup
The solution for reaching SMTP servers behind NAT is less complex than the
one for HTTP, simply because SMTP always uses the domain name to determine
the destination email server.
The initial setup for this solution is shown in figure 4.10. The solution uses
an SMTP relay, which is an intermediate SMTP server that acts as a relay to
deliver email messages. The NAT router should forward all SMTP traffic, i.e.,
TCP connections destined to the standard SMTP port 25, to the SMTP relay.
Use of SMTP Relay
When an external SMTP server tries to connect to an SMTP server within
the private network, is first uses DNS to lookup the MX entry for the destination
server. Therefore, MX entries in the public DNS servers must be updated with
the SMTP relay’s IP address, which is basically the NAT’s public IP address.
After the source SMTP server resolves the domain name and finds the IP
address of the SMTP relay, it initiates a TCP connection to send the messages.
The NAT router receives the connection destined to port 25, and forwards it
directly to the SMTP relay. The relay accepts the connection, and receives the
messages. Then, it queues them to be sent to their final destinations. The SMTP
relay uses the internal DNS servers in order to resolve the domain names and
find the private IP addresses of the destination mail servers. It then establishes
connections to these servers and deliver the email messages.
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Figure 4.10: Initial setup for accessing SMTP servers behind NAT uses an SMTP
relay server as an intermediate message delivery point
Example of Delivering an Email Message
For example, an external mail server attempts to deliver an email message to
user@alpha.com. The server will lookup the MX entry for alpha.com, using a
public DNS server, then it connects to the found IP address. That IP address
belongs to the NAT router, which is configured to forward all incoming packets
destined to the SMTP port 25, to the SMTP relay.
The SMTP relay accepts the connection, then receives the email message
though SMTP. After that, the relay uses the internal DNS server to lookup the
MX entry for alpha.com. The private IP address of that server is found, and
the relay establishes a connection to the server alpha.com and delivers the email
message.
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4.4 Management of IP addresses
The proposed NAT solution for the Internet denial is based on hiding the
identity of traffic in order to deceive the malicious ISPs to route the traffic. The
IP addresses that are used for NAT belong to a different network that the malicious
ISPs are not blocking. We assumed earlier that the ISPs will block the IP address
blocks only once. That is, malicious ISPs will not try to detect or block new IP
addresses that the victim network may use after the initial blocking. However, it
is very important to keep the NAT IP addresses unexposed to the malicious ISPs.
It should not be evident to the ISPs that the new IP addresses are being used
by the blocked network to bypass the blocking. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between two approaches to manage the new, unblocked public IP addresses.
The first approach is to use the available IP addresses for both local clients
and servers, as shown in figure 4.11. The IP addresses that are used in the
NAT router to map outgoing traffic are also used as addresses for the HTTP
and SMTP servers. Domain name and MX entries in the public DNS servers are
updated with these IPs. This approach provides better utilization of the available
IP address space, and therefore, requires less number of IP addresses to be used
for the solution. However, because public DNS servers are updated with these
IP addresses, malicious ISPs can detect that services within the blocked network
are using new IP addresses. Consequently, the malicious ISPs will block the new
IP addresses, and the whole victim network, including both clients and servers, is
blocked again.
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Figure 4.11: Using the same IP addresses clients and servers
The other approach is to separate the IP address blocks for clients and servers.
As figure 4.12 shows, the NAT routers can use a pool of IP addresses to map
outgoing traffic, and the servers are mapped to a different pool of IP addresses.
Entries in the DNS servers are updated only with the server IP addresses. Hence,
the IP address block that is used by the clients is not exposed to the malicious
ISPs. Even if the malicious ISPs detected that the servers are using new IP
addresses, blocking these IP addresses will only make the servers unreachable,
but the clients would still be able to use the Internet. Although this approach has
higher costs as it requires more IP addresses, it provides better security for client
connectivity.
The assumption that the malicious ISPs will not perform any subsequent block-
ing of IP addresses makes both approaches similar in terms of security, but the
first approach is better in IP address utilization. However, depending on the moti-
vations of malicious ISPs, it is probable that they will block any new IP addresses
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Figure 4.12: Using separate IP addresses for clients and servers
that belong to the victim network. Hence, the second approach provides better
robustness against being blocked again, as only a small portion of the IP addresses
might be blocked.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
The proposed solutions for HTTP and SMTP servers add extra overhead to the
network, and therefore, have some impact on the performance. Simulations are
used to evaluate the performance of the proposed solution for the HTTP servers
behind NAT. The SMTP solution, on the other hand, is not simulated. The reason
is that the delivery of email messages over SMTP protocol is not time–critical.
The additional delay caused by the use of SMTP relays would only effect the
end-to-end delivery time of the message. This delay, nevertheless, is not critical
for an application like SMTP.
The objective of simulating the HTTP solution is to measure the impact of
implementing the web server solution on the network performance. Two metrics
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are used for measurements: end-to-end delay between the clients and servers, and
the throughput of the sent and received traffic.
4.5.1 Modeling of Web Switch Delay
The processing done in the web switch is similar to the one NAT does, but
in a reversed direction. The web switch maps incoming connections to their cor-
responding servers. The use of NAT table, and the translation of addresses and
ports, are very similar to NAT. The proposed solution requires layer-7 processing
of only the first packet, and subsequent packets are processed at layer-4. Hence, it
can be assumed that the performance evaluation of NAT is a good approximation
of the performance of a web switch, except for the layer-7 processing.
In order to measure the effect of layer-7 processing on the performance, the web
switch delay is implemented in OPNET such that it adds an extra processing delay
for the first packet of a request. Subsequent packets only suffer from the layer-4
NAT delay, which is smaller than the web switch delay. The implementation is
done such that when a NAT table lookup is added, the packet processing delay
is increased by the web switch delay. This is because NAT table entries are only
added for the first packet of every session, which is the same packet that will have
layer-7 processing. The processing time of all subsequent packets and responses
only suffers from a small extra NAT delay.
89
Figure 4.13: Simulated scenario for the HTTP server reachability solution
4.5.2 Simulated Scenario
The simulated scenario is similar to the one used in NAT evaluation, as shown
in figure 4.13. The scenario consists of two networks, local and remote. Each
network is connected to the Internet cloud by a gateway router. The local network
consists of 3 web servers, and the local gateway is a web switch that has the
implementation of NAT delay and web switch delay. The remote network consists
of a 100BaseT Fast Ethernet LAN, with 10 hosts that act as web clients. The
intermediate links, connecting gateway routers to the Internet, are DS-1 links with
1.544 Mbps data rate.
The measurements are selected to compare the performance of using a normal
router, where servers have public IP addresses, with the use of a web switch, where
packets suffer added NAT and web switch delays.
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4.5.3 Simulation Setup and Parameters
Because all packets that pass through the web switch are translated, NAT
delay is added to the processing time. It was shown earlier that the realistic
range for simulated NAT delay is between 10µs and 50µs. We select 50µs as the
simulated NAT delay, to measure the impact of the worst-case scenario.
It was shown earlier that the significant degradation of performance caused by
NAT is very similar for low and medium traffic. Therefore, we will only simulate
two traffic scenarios: low, where 25% of the bandwidth is utilized (about 380
kbps), and high, where 75% of the bandwidth is used (about 1,200 kbps).
The web switch delay is caused by the processing of layer-7 information. There-
fore, this delay is expected to be higher than the one caused by NAT for layer-4
processing. In the simulations, we vary the amount of web switch delay from
100µs to 400µs. This delay is only added to the first incoming packet of the ses-
sion. Figure 4.14 shows the simulated end-to-end delay of a single client sending
requests to the servers. It is noticed that at the beginning of each session, a small
increase of the end-to-end delay occurs, which is the added web switch delay.
4.5.4 Simulation of End-to-end Delay
The impact of web switch on end-to-end delay is simulated. The delay is
measured as the time a packet takes to traverse from the client to the server,
including the transmission, queuing, NAT, and web switch delays.
Figure 4.15 shows the simulated end-to-end delay for the low traffic scenario. It
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Figure 4.14: End-to-end delay for low web traffic
is noticed that a small increase is caused by the web switch. The effect increases as
the web switch delay is increased. About 100µs additional delay is measured when
the web switch delay is 100µs, but it increases by 300µs for a web switch delay of
400µs. There are two factors causing this increase. First, all packets require extra
processing time because of the added NAT delay. Second, some packets, namely
the first packet of every HTTP session, suffers an extra web switch processing
delay. These two factors cause the increase of the end-to-end delay.
For the high traffic scenario, figure 4.16 shows the measured end-to-end delay
from the client to the server. Similar to the previous scenario, the end-to-end
delay increases when a web switch is used because of the added web switch and
NAT delays which cause all packets to require extra processing time.
Figure 4.17 shows the amount of end-to-end delay increase caused by the
introduction of a web switch. This increase is computed as (DelayWebSwitch −
DelayRouter). It is noticed that the increase in the low traffic scenario is in the
92
Figure 4.15: End-to-end delay for low web traffic
Figure 4.16: End-to-end delay for high web traffic
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Figure 4.17: Increase in end-to-end delay for web traffic
order of hundreds of microseconds, whereas the increase in the high traffic scenario
is in the order of milliseconds.
The relative increase, computed as (DelayWebSwitch−DelayRouter)
DelayRouter
is shown in fig-
ure 4.18. Although the amount of increase in high traffic scenario is higher, the
relative increase is smaller than the low traffic scenario. This has also been no-
ticed earlier when NAT is simulated. The reason, as mentioned earlier, is that the
processing delay for high traffic becomes less significant than the queuing delay.
Hence, the relative increase, caused by NAT and web switch delay, is smaller.
We also notice that the maximum increase does not exceed 0.4% of the total
end-to-end delay, which is similar to the results found in the simulation of NAT.
This increase does not have significant effect on the performance. Hence, we can
conclude that the proposed HTTP server solution has a small, insignificant impact
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Figure 4.18: Relative Increase in end-to-end delay for web traffic
on the end-to-end delay.
4.5.5 Simulation of Traffic Throughput
The throughput is measured in the simulation as the amount of traffic ex-
changed between the clients and servers. We measure the throughput as the
traffic received on the client side.
In the earlier simulations of NAT delay, we noticed that NAT has zero impact
on the throughput for low and medium traffic. The throughput is impacted only
for the high traffic scenario.
The impact of the web server solution on the throughput is similar to the im-
pact of NAT. The simulations show no impact on the traffic throughput in the low
traffic scenario. However, the impact starts to appear in the high traffic scenario,
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Figure 4.19: Throughput for high web traffic
as shown in figure 4.19. We notice that the throughput starts to decrease when
the simulated web switch delay increases. This is because the added processing
delay causes more packets to be queued in the web switch’s queue. Hence, The
amount of transmitted traffic is lower.
The amount of throughput decrease caused by the introduction of a web
switch is shown in figure 4.20. The decrease is computed as (ThroughputRouter −
ThroughputWebSwitch). We notice that the amount of decrease is relatively low; a
maximum decrease of 250 bytes per second is experienced when the web switch
delay is as high as 400µs. Relatively, as shown in figure 4.21, the amount of de-
crease is limited to about 0.2% of the total throughput. This decrease is very low,
and hence, can be considered negligible.
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Figure 4.20: Decrease of throughput for web traffic
Figure 4.21: Relative decrease of throughput for web traffic
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4.6 Conclusion
The simulation results show that the proposed solution for HTTP servers be-
hind NAT does not cause any significant impact on the end-to-end delay or the
throughput. The simulations were performed with the worst-case scenario pa-
rameters, i.e., high NAT delay and high web switch delay. Therefore, the realistic
implementation of this solution on hardware would cause even less impact on the
performance. Hence, we can conclude that the proposed solution has negligibly
small impact on the performance of the network.
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CHAPTER 5
PEER-TO-PEER
CONNECTIVITY BEHIND
NAT
In this chapter, we will look into the connectivity limitations introduced by
NAT that affect peer-to-peer applications. Users in peer-to-peer networks must
be able to initiate connections to remote users, and receive connections from other
users. Because all users behind NAT appear to the Internet as a single entity, they
cannot receive incomming connections. This impacts the peer-to-peer connectivity
between users.
99
5.1 NAT Impact on Peer-to-Peer Applications
5.1.1 P2P vs Client-Server Applications
Network applications are classified into two types: client-server applications,
and peer-to-peer (p2p) applications. In client-server applications, the client ini-
tiates the connection, sends the requests, and receives responses. A server is a
centralized source that accepts connections and responds to requests. The service
is only provided by the server, and all clients have to connect to that server to
use this service. The World Wide Web (WWW) is an example of client-server
applications, where clients must connect to servers in order to load pages and
browse websites.
Peer-to-peer (p2p) applications, on the other hand, have decentralized services.
Every peer in the p2p system is both a client and a server; it initiates connections
to other peers, and accepts connections from others. Many file-sharing applica-
tions, such as Gnutella and BitTorrent, are p2p. Users on the network connect to
each other to download and upload files. Figure 5.1 shows the difference between
client-server and p2p applications models.
5.1.2 Lack of End-To-End Connectivity
One of the drawbacks of NAT is the limitation of end-to-end connectivity
between hosts. This limitation prevents p2p applications from working properly.
The reason is that a peer in a p2p network acts as both a client and a server.
NAT only allows connections to be initiated from within the private network, and
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Figure 5.1: Peer-to-peer and client-server application models
destined to a host in the public Internet. Incoming connections are not received
by the peer because there is no way of addressing the peer, as the private network
behind NAT is seen by outsiders as a single host. Therefore, p2p applications will
only act as clients, but not servers. This could work for some applications where
the connections are initiated by the peers behind NAT. However, if the remote
peer is also behind NAT, the problem is more complex.
5.1.3 Internet Denial Solution and P2P Applications
The introduction of NAT as a solution to the Internet denial problem results
in connectivity issues for peer-to-peer applications. Moreover, users within the
private network may have NAT routers at their local networks. Hence, introducing
the NAT solution adds a new layer of NAT, resulting in multi-level NAT at the
local user side. Peers on the public network may also have NAT on their own
networks, adding a third level of NAT, as shown in figure 5.2. This scenario
is more complex to resolve as it causes many p2p applications to stop working
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Figure 5.2: Multi-level NAT on both networks affects connectivity in p2p appli-
cations. Deployment of NAT solution adds additional level of complexity.
properly.
5.2 Related Work
Peer-to-peer applications have become very popular in the last few years. Stud-
ies show that p2p applications are responsible for more than 60% of the Internet
traffic [62, 63]. The growth of p2p applications has been a motivation for many
works that address p2p issues, such as connectivity, security, and performance.
5.2.1 NAT Behavior
The standard specification of NAT, like many other protocols’ specifications,
does not define all the implementation details. Some details are left to the vendors
to implement in their way. Current NAT implementations differ not only from
vendor to vendor, but also from model to model. Some of these differences can
affect application connectivity. An application that works on one NAT environ-
ment may not work on another NAT environment. Many works have been done
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Figure 5.3: Full Cone NAT matches incoming packets using their destination port
only
to discover and classify the behavior of NAT.
For example, Simple Traversal of UDP Through NAT (STUN) [64] was a
protocol used to determine the behavior of NAT and classify it into one of four
types:
 Full Cone: Requests from the same internal IP address and port are
mapped to the same external IP address and port, even if the destination is
different. Furthermore, any external host can send packets to the internal
host, by sending the packets to the mapped external IP address and port.
In other words, matching between the NAT table entries and the incom-
ing packets are performed on the packet’s destination IP address and port
only. Figure 5.3 shows an example of how packets from different hosts and
different ports are allowed to be forwarded to the client.
 Restricted Cone: Similar to a Full Cone NAT, requests from the same
internal IP address and port are mapped to the same external IP address
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Figure 5.4: Restricted Cone NAT allows incoming packets only from the original
destination host
and port. However, an external host A can send packets to the internal host
only if the internal host had previously sent a packet to the IP address of
host A. Hence, matching of incoming packets are performed on the packet’s
source IP address and destination IP address and port. Figure 5.4 shows an
example of a Restricted Cone NAT.
 Port-Restricted Cone: It only differs from Restricted Cone NAT in the
matching of incoming packets. It blocks all packets unless the client had
previously sent out a packet to the IP and port pair that is sending to
the NAT. Hence, the NAT table matching is performed on all the packet’s
address information, namely the destination IP address and port, and the
source IP address and port. An example is shown in figure 5.5.
 Symmetric: This type of NAT differs from the first three in that outgoing
packets are mapped uniquely. In Cone NATs, the same external IP address
and port are used for all packets sent from the same internal IP address
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Figure 5.5: Port-Restricted Cone NAT allows incoming packets only from the
original destination host and port number
and port. In contrast, packets in Symmetric NAT are mapped to different
external IP address and port if they were destined to a different IP address or
port. Figure 5.6 shows the difference in external address and port mapping
between Cone NAT and Symmetric NAT.
This classification of NAT, though used in many protocols, was proven to be
faulty, as many NAT environments do not fit cleanly into one of these types.
Moreover, the behavior of some NAT routers is nondeterministic, as they may
change their method of mapping and translation in some situations [65].
5.2.2 NAT Traversal Techniques
Much works have been done to resolve the NAT drawback of limiting con-
nectivity. Different techniques and protocols were proposed as solutions to this
problem. These solutions are called NAT Traversal techniques and protocols, as
they are basically used to traverse packets over NAT.
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Figure 5.6: Cone and Symmetric NAT are different in the port mapping of out-
going packets
A NAT traversal technique is an approach for the process of establishing a
connection between hosts that are located behind NAT. A NAT traversal protocol,
on the other hand, is what defines how these techniques are used, and how the
communication between hosts is performed. A NAT traversal protocol may use
one or more NAT traversal technique in order to achieve connectivity.
NAT traversal techniques can be classified into two types: control-based NAT
traversal and behavior-based NAT traversal [66]. The difference between them is
whether the host explicitly cooperates with the NAT router to achieve connectiv-
ity. In control-based techniques, the NAT router provides cooperative functional-
ity to help hosts in establishing and receiving external connections. On the other
hand, the host in behavior-based techniques exploits the behavior of NAT in order
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Figure 5.7: Control-based NAT traversal techniques allow clients to configure a
port or socket to receive incoming traffic over it
to traverse traffic. The NAT router does not provide any additional functionality
to help in traffic traversal.
Control-Based NAT Traversal
In control-based techniques, the host communicates with the NAT router in
order to allow connection establishment. These set of techniques are based on
the idea that “NAT can completely and correctly be implemented only with the
knowledge and help of the end hosts behind a NAT gateway” [67]. Hosts in
the private network communicate with the NAT router to map specific ports or
sockets, then they receive traffic over these mappings as figure 5.7 shows.
Port forwarding is a popular control-based technique. The NAT router allows
the client to map a port so that all incoming connections destined to that port are
forwarded to the client’s address. This allows the client to receive connections on
the selected port. Almost all NAT routers allow manual port-forwarding, i.e., the
router can be configured to forward traffic destined to a specific port to a static
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host within the private network. Dynamic port-forwarding, on the other hand,
requires the support of one or more port-forwarding protocols.
Internet Gateway Device Protocol (IGD) [68], also known as Universal Plug
and Play (UPnP), is a popular port-forwarding protocol that is implemented in
many routers. It allows hosts to learn the public IP address, and add port map-
pings to their addresses. NAT Port Mapping Protocol (NAT-PMP) [69] is a similar
protocol that was introduced as a standard alternative to IGD.
Realm-Specific IP (RSIP) [70] is an experimental protocol intended to re-
place the behavior of NAT. It maintains end-to-end connectivity by allowing hosts
within the private network to borrow public IP addresses and ports from the NAT
router in order to communicate through them. Though it was proposed back in
2001, this protocol is still in the experimental stage, and is not widely deployed
yet.
Middlebox Communication (MIDCOM) [71] defines the functionalities for mid-
dleboxes, intermediate devices that provide specific services, such as NAT and
firewall. MIDCOM protocol modifies NAT functionality by moving the control of
NAT resources, namely IP addresses and ports, to the protocol clients. Hence,
clients can configure NAT dynamically to forward incoming traffic to them.
The other control-based technique for NAT traversal is traffic gateways. In this
technique, NAT routers can act as transport– or application–layer traffic relays,
allowing clients to establish or receive connections over them. Hence, the NAT
router acts as a proxy for the traffic.
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SOCKS [72] is a standard transport-layer gateway that allows hosts to initiate
and receive TCP and UDP connections. A host, for example, can connect to the
SOCKS server in the NAT router, and request it to initiate a TCP connection
to an external server. Similar to the port-forwarding protocols, the host can also
request to bind a port to its address, so that it can receive incoming connections.
Application-Level Gateway (ALG), is defined in RFC2663 [73] as an
application–specific agent that runs on the NAT router and allows an applica-
tion on the host to establish and receive connections. It allows NAT to perform
address and port translation for certain applications, such as File Transfer Proto-
col (FTP), Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), and Real Time Streaming Protocol
(RTSP).
All control-based NAT traversal techniques allow clients to map a port to
receive incoming connections through it. Traffic gateway techniques are different
from port-forwarding techniques only in the way they handle outgoing connections.
Gateway techniques relay the traffic over the NAT router rather than translating
it normally like port-forwarding techniques do.
Behavior-Based NAT Traversal
In behavior-based NAT traversal techniques, the NAT router does not pro-
vide any additional functionality to help hosts establish connections. Instead,
hosts exploit the behavior of NAT in order to achieve connectivity. Most existing
behavior-based NAT traversal protocols are based on one of three fundamental
techniques: connection reversal, hole–punching, and relaying [74].
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Figure 5.8: Connection reversal technique is used when one of the peers is behind
NAT and the other one is not
Connection reversal is a straightforward but limited technique that is used
when one of the peers is behind NAT and the other is not. First, The two peers
communicate through a coordinating server to exchange their connection status.
The server determines which peer is behind NAT, and informs it to initiate the
connection, even if it is acting as a server in the p2p application, as shown in
figure 5.8. This way, the connection will pass through the NAT router normally,
since it is initiated from within the NAT to an external host.
The connection reversal technique is only useful when one of the two hosts is
not behind NAT, i.e., it has a public IP address. It does not work in the situation
where the two hosts are behind NAT.
Connection reversal is used in some peer-to-peer applications, such as
Kazaa [75] and Limewire [76]. It helps in establishing connection when only one
of the peers is behind NAT, but not when both peers are behind NAT.
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Hole–punching is a technique that enables two peers, who are both behind
NAT, to setup a direct p2p session with the help of a coordinating server. Hole–
punching is based on the idea that NAT routers use their NAT tables to map
responses of outgoing packets. Each peer, with the help of the coordinating server,
initiates a connection to the other peer. The NAT routers will add entries in their
tables to map responses coming to the same source ports. The initial packets may
be dropped at the other peer’s NAT because the NAT table entry is not added
yet. Once both NAT routers are hole–punched, the two peers can communicate
directly.
Hole–punching, as shown in figure 5.9, assumes that the two peers, A and B,
already have active sessions with the coordinating server. The server is used to
inform each peer about the public IP address and port of the other peer. Peer
A sends a packet to B’s public IP address. That packet is dropped by B’s NAT,
because there is no NAT table entry that maps incoming traffic on that port yet.
However, an entry is added to A’s NAT table, allowing incoming packets on that
port to be forwarded to peer A. Peer B now sends a packet, which is received
by peer A. At the same time, B’s NAT router adds an entry to its NAT table,
allowing B to receive packets. Now both A and B can communicate directly
without the need for the server, because both NATs accept incoming packets on
the mapped ports.
TCP hole–punching is more difficult than UDP, due to the three–way hand-
shake required by TCP [77]. NAT routers check the TCP packet flags, such as
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Figure 5.9: Hole-punching technique is used when both peers are behind NAT.
Each peer sends a packet to add an entry to its NAT table
SYN and ACK, to determine the start of the session, and add the NAT table entry
based on these flags. Some techniques, such as IP address spoofing and delayed-
packets, are sometimes needed to accomplish the TCP hole–punching process.
Relaying is the most reliable, but least efficient, method of p2p communication
across NAT. It is the process of carrying all traffic between the two peers over a
central host, the relay server, which has a public IP address. Relaying makes the
communication look to the NAT router as standard client-server communication,
because both peers initiate connections to the relay server. Relaying always works
as long as both clients can connect to the relay server. Figure 5.10 shows how
peers can use a public relay server to communicate.
Relaying has many disadvantages. It consumes the server’s processing power,
requires more network bandwidth, and increases the communication latency be-
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Figure 5.10: Traffic relaying technique works with all NAT configurations, as it
makes peers act as client to the relay server
tween the peering clients. Moreover, relaying eliminates the advantages of us-
ing peer-to-peer systems, as the network becomes centralized at the relay server.
Nevertheless, since there is no more efficient technique that works reliably on all
existing NATs, relaying is a useful fallback strategy when no other NAT traversal
technique works.
Many behavior-based NAT Traversal protocols have been proposed. Simple
Traversal of UDP Through NAT (STUN) [64] was introduced as a complete NAT
traversal solution based on hole–punching. It allowed clients to determine their
NAT type, and perform hole–punching with the help of a STUN server. The
protocol was proven to be faulty, and was modified later to become a tool for
NAT information discovery, instead of a NAT traversal solution. Its name has
been changed to Session Traversal Utilities for NAT [78]. STUN is now used as
a knowledge-collection tool in many other NAT traversal protocols.
A modification of STUN to support TCP was proposed by Guha in [79]. The
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protocol, Simple traversal of UDP through NATs and TCP (STUNT), uses more
complex operations, such as sending packets with low Time-To-Live (TTL), IP
address spoofing, and modifying TCP sequence numbers.
Wacker et al. [80] proposed a method of using STUN in peer-to-peer networks.
In this method, the peers who are not behind NAT, having public IP address, are
used as STUN servers and relay servers to help other peers who are behind NAT.
The method classifies the NAT type of both peers, then selects whether to use
connection reversal, hole–punching, or relaying to establish the connectivity.
NATBLASTER [81] is another TCP hole–punching protocol. It is similar to
STUNT, but uses port–prediction to determine which TCP ports will be used
next by the NAT router based on its behavior.
Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) [82] is a relaying protocol that
is designed as an extension for STUN. It uses relay servers to transfer UDP traffic
between hosts.
Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [83] is a comprehensive protocol
for NAT traversal that uses STUN, TURN, and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
to establish UDP connections between peers. It runs a set of tests with the help
of STUN servers in order to determine which technique to use. ICE-TCP [84] is
an extension that supports the establishment of TCP connections with ICE.
Guha proposed a NAT traversal protocol called NUTSS (NAT,URIs, Tunnel,
SIP, and STUN) [85]. It uses different techniques to establish TCP and UDP con-
nections, such as SIP, STUN, and port prediction. However, this protocol requires
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some packets to be sent with spoofed IP addresses, which makes it impractical for
Internet use.
Eppinger [86] proposed a software approach that utilizes hole–punching to
initiate TCP connections between peers. This approach works only with cone
NATs, but not with symmetric NATs.
A solution for symmetric NAT traversal is proposed by Wei et al. [87]. It is
based on multi hole–punching, where each host sends a large number of packets
with different port numbers in order to add more entries in the NAT table. Then,
port–prediction is used to determine the mapped ports which can accept incoming
traffic. This solution shows high success rate of connectivity, where 97% of the
tested NAT were able to establish UDP connections.
Chen et al. [88] have proposed NAT–next–generation (NATng), a modification
of DNS and NAT to support the use of public and private IP addresses together.
Hosts can initiate connections to other hosts behind NATng directly by addressing
them using the tuple of the public IP address and the private IP address. This
technique, however, requires the modification of NAT and DNS to support the
use of two IP addresses together.
Skype, a popular p2p voice-over-IP (VoIP) application, uses a set of NAT
traversal techniques. It uses UDP hole-punching to traverse cone NAT [89]. When
hole–punching is not working, as the case with symmetric NAT, Skype relays
traffic over other peers on the network who have public IP addresses [90].
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5.3 Qualitative Analysis of NAT Traversal Tech-
niques
Most of the reviewed NAT traversal techniques and protocols are designed to
work with single-level NAT, i.e., each host is behind one NAT router that has a
public IP address. As shown earlier, the NAT-based solution for Internet denial
can result in having two layers of NAT for the local peers, as they may already
have NAT in their local networks. Only few research works address the multi-level
NAT problem.
For each NAT traversal technique, the connectivity and performance issues
will be discussed, and both single-level NAT and multi-level NAT situations are
considered.
5.3.1 Analysis of Control-Based Techniques
In normal NAT networks, control-based techniques are designed to work with
all types of NAT, as the NAT router provides the additional functionality that
helps hosts establish connections. Both port-forwarding and gateway are expected
to work when each peer is either directly connected or behind a single NAT router.
However, when another layer of NAT is introduced, as shown in figure 5.11,
the connectivity is not always possible unless clients are aware of the existence
of two NATs. The NAT router 3.3.4.4 represents the one added for the Internet
denial solution, and the other two NAT routers, 5.5.6.6 and 8.8.9.9, are the local
and remote network NAT routers, respectively. We notice that on the local side,
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Figure 5.11: Multi-level NAT example. Local peer is behind two levels of NAT,
and remote peer is behind one NAT router.
peers can either be behind two levels of NAT, or can be directly connected to the
second NAT router, 3.3.4.4.
Connectivity of Port-Forwarding Technique
When peer 2 uses port-forwarding for NAT traversal, its NAT router will
be able to forward all incoming traffic to that peer. Whether the connection is
initiated from peer 1 or peer 3, the connection will always be established.
On the other hand, when peer 3 is using port-forwarding to receive connections,
it will also be accessible to peer 1 and peer 2. A connection initiated from peer
1 to peer 3 will pass through the NAT router 5.5.6.6 as an outgoing connection.
Therefore, the connection will be established. However, peer 3 needs to use port–
forwarding on the NAT router 3.3.4.4 in order to be able to receive connections
from peer 2 or other hosts on the Internet.
Finally, peer 1 can use port–forwarding on the its local router, 5.5.6.6, to
receive connections from the private network and peer 3. However, peer 1 will
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not be able to receive any connection from peer 2 unless it uses port-forwarding
on the two NAT routers, 5.5.6.6 and 3.3.4.4. Therefore, peer 1 needs to perform
two port mappings in order to be able to receive connections from Internet hosts.
This requires modifications of existing port–forwarding protocols in the client in
order to support multi-level NAT mappings.
Connectivity of Traffic Gateway Technique
In traffic gateway NAT traversal, peers use the NAT router for both establish-
ing and receiving connections. When peer 1 initiates a connection to peer 3, it
uses its local NAT router, 5.5.6.6, as a gateway. However, to initiate a connection
to peer 2, it must use the external NAT router as the gateway. Therefore, peers
behind two-levels of NAT must be able to determine which NAT router should be
used as a traffic gateway. A peer can try to perform the connection using both
NATs, and use the one that connects successfully. However, it should be aware of
the presence of the two NAT routers.
When peer 2 and peer 3 try to establish connections, they use their gateway
NAT router as the traffic gateway. The destination must also use the traffic
gateway technique to accept incoming connections through NAT.
Performance of Control-Based Techniques
Control–based techniques, namely port–forwarding and traffic gateway, coop-
erate with the NAT router to perform NAT traversal. The performance impact of
these techniques is limited to the setup overhead, where peers communicate with
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Figure 5.12: Multi-level NAT example. Local peers is behind one or two levels of
NAT, and remote peers are directly connected or behind one NAT router.
the NAT router to map a specific port or socket. The remaining packets are not
affected by the use of port-forwarding or traffic gateway. Therefore, control-based
techniques have very small impact on the performance which can be negligible
when the connection session time is relatively long.
5.3.2 Analysis of Behavior-Based Techniques
Behavior-based techniques, namely connection reversal, relaying, and hole–
punching, can be affected by the introduction of a second layer of NAT in terms
of connectivity and performance. Figure 5.12 shows an example of a situation
where two levels of NAT are on the local side, and one NAT router is on the
remote side. Hosts can be either directly connected to the Internet, such as peer
4; connected to one NAT router, such as peers 2 and 3, or connected to two NAT
routers, such as peer 1.
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Connection Reversal
Connection reversal does not add any overhead to the connection process.
However, it only works in situations where one of the peers has a public IP address.
In the example shown in figure 5.12, peer 4 can be reached by all other peers using
connection reversal, since it has a public IP address. Connection reversal does not
provide any means for connectivity between other peers. However, we notice that
peer 1 and 3 can communicate using connection reversal, because peer 3 is on the
external network of peer 1.
There is no performance impact when connection reversal is used. However, it
does not work with most scenarios, and can only be considered as a limited NAT
traversal technique.
UDP and TCP Hole-Punching
Hole–punching depends heavily on the behavior of NAT. STUN [64] and
ICE [83] are examples of protocols that use a set of tests to determine the behavior
of NAT before they perform hole-punching. We assume that the NAT routers in
our example are cone-type that allow hole–punching.
Ford et al. [91] have studied the situation of two-level NAT. They have shown
that TCP and UDP hole-punching can be used to communicate between hosts in
different NATs. However, that depends heavily on the types of NATs that hosts
are connected to. 82% of the NAT routers supported UDP hole-punching, but
only 64% supported TCP hole–punching.
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In the previous example shown in figure 5.12, when peer 1 and peer 2 use hole–
punching to establish a connection, each peer sends an initial packet to setup a
NAT table entry in its NAT router. The packet sent by peer 1 will go through
both NAT routers, 5.5.6.6 and 3.3.4.4. Each router will add a NAT table entry
for that packet to map incoming responses. Similarly, the packet sent by peer 2
will add an entry in the NAT router 8.8.9.9. At this point, all routers can receive
traffic on the mapped ports, and the connection is now established.
Similarly, connectivity between peer 2 and peer 3 can also be established using
hole–punching. Each initial packet will go through one NAT router, and a NAT
table entry is added at each router. Connections to peer 4, on the other hand, do
not require hole–punching, as that peer has a public IP address. Moreover, peer
1 can connect directly to peer 3 without the need for hole-punching, as there is
only one NAT router between them.
The complications of hole-punching appear when one of the NAT is a sym-
metric NAT. The mapped external port are usually undetermined, and therefore,
the other peer does not know which port should be the destination of its packet.
Some research work has been done on the prediction of mapped ports [81, 87].
In terms of performance, hole-punching requires sending a number of initial
packets to map NAT table entries. Once the connection is established, however,
there is no impact on the performance of the network. Hence, the setup overhead
is the only impact on the network performance, and it is negligibly small for
normal–length sessions.
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Relaying
Relaying is the only NAT traversal technique that works with all NAT types
and topologies. In the previous example, if peer 4 is a relay server, all other
peers can connect to it, as it has a public IP address. Traffic, therefore, can be
exchanged between peers by relaying through peer 4.
However, the performance impact of relaying is very high. For example, when
peer 1 and peer 2 are communicating through peer 4 as a relay, each peer sends
packets to peer 4, and then peer 4 sends them to the other peer. The relay server
uses twice the bandwidth of the traffic that is exchanged between peers, because
it receives and sends traffic to both peers. This results in high computational
requirements of the relay.
End-to-end delay is also affected by the introduction of a relay. Each packet is
sent first to the relay server, then the relay sends it to the other peer. Therefore,
end-to-end delay may double. For high-traffic scenarios, it is expected that end-
to-end delay increases even more due to the queuing that takes place in the relay
server and the intermediate routers.
5.4 Usage of NAT Traversal for the Internet De-
nial Solution
The proposed solution for Internet denial is based on using NAT to hide the
traffic identity. Therefore, p2p applications need to use NAT traversal protocols
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in order to achieve connectivity. The modification of these applications may take
place on the local clients, the NAT routers, and/or the remote clients on the
Internet, depending on the NAT traversal protocol that is used.
5.4.1 Deployment of Control-based NAT Traversal
Control-based protocols require NAT routers to provide the traversal service in
order to allow clients to map ports to their addresses. Therefore, the NAT router
should support one or more of the control-based protocols. Moreover, the p2p
application that clients are using should also support the usage of these protocols.
The presence of two NAT routers may require additional modifications of the p2p
application.
Although the control-based techniques provide high connectivity compared
with behavior-based techniques, they have some security issues. Most control-
based protocols are designed for small networks, such as home networks. They do
not fit large-scale network. When the network is larger, the port-forwarding could
be abused, where a client may map many ports to its address. Moreover, when
there are many clients, many port-forwarding requests will fail because other hosts
have already allocated the selected ports. Therefore, port-forwarding protocols are
not viable for large NAT environments.
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5.4.2 Deployment of Behavior-based NAT Traversal
Behavior-based NAT traversal protocols are more suitable for large–scale NAT
networks. As shown earlier, the three fundamental techniques that all protocols
are using are connection reversal, hole–punching, and relaying. All the three
techniques require modifying the p2p applications in both local and remote peers.
However, no modification is required in the NAT routers.
Connection reversal, as shown earlier, is limited to scenarios where one of the
peers has a public IP address. On the other hand, hole–punching and relaying can
work with different scenarios. Most popular p2p applications, such as Skype, Bit-
Torrent, Gnutella, and LimeWire, support NAT traversal protocols that support
one or both of these techniques [92].
When the Internet denial solution is deployed, p2p applications in the private
network can use hole–punching to establish connections. However, some NAT
environments do not allow or support hole–punching. Therefore, relaying is used
as the last solution when other techniques are unusable.
5.5 Performance Evaluation of NAT Traversal
Using Relaying
The impact of most NAT traversal techniques is limited to the setup time.
Relaying, on the other hand, has much more impact on the network performance.
A relay server is required to have enough bandwidth and processing power to
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Figure 5.13: Simulated scenario to measure the effect of relaying in peer-to-peer
communication
carry traffic between peers. Therefore, the performance of relaying is evaluated
through simulations in order to measure the cost of this solution.
The objective of the simulations is to compare the network performance before
and after adding a relay server to carry traffic between peers. Two scenarios are
compared: direct communication between peers, where the relay server is not
used; and the communication through relaying server, where all traffic between
peers is carried by an intermediate relay server. The used performance metrics
are the end-to-end delay of packets, and the traffic throughput.
5.5.1 Simulation Scenario and Setup
Figure 5.13 shows the network used in the simulations. There are two networks,
local and remote, that are connected through gateway routers to the Internet
cloud. A third network, consisting of the relay server, is also connected through
a router to the Internet cloud.
The local and remote networks are 100BaseT Fast Ethernet networks. Each
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network has 10 hosts that will serve as peers in the p2p network. All the routers
are based on the generic router model in OPNET. The two routers connecting
LANs to the Internet are connected to the central Internet cloud using DS–1
links, which provide a data rate of 1.544 Mbps. The router that connects the
relay server to the Internet is connected through a DS–3 link, providing a data
rate of 44.736 Mbps.
The link that connects the relay server to the Internet has higher bandwidth
than the other links connecting peers to the Internet. The reason is that that the
relay server requires twice the bandwidth that is required by peers as it carries
traffic over both networks.
The simulated application is Video Conferencing, which runs over UDP. Four
traffic scenarios are simulated: 300 Kbps, 600 Kbps, 900 Kbps, and 1,200 Kbps.
These traffic values represent the amount of traffic sent from peers on one network
to peers on the other network.
Each simulation is run with 5 different seed values, and the average of the 5
results is computed. Performance is evaluated by comparing the scenario of direct
communication between peers with the scenario of using the relay to carry traffic.
5.5.2 Simulation of End-to-End Delay
The effect of relaying on peer-to-peer network is expected to be high. The
reason is the relay carries twice the packets; traffic from each peer to the relay
server, and traffic from the relay to each peer. Therefore, an increase by 100% is
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Figure 5.14: End-to-end delay for P2P network (logarithmic scale)
expected to take place when relaying is used.
The measured end-to-end delay for the direct and relaying scenarios is shown
in figure 5.14. We notice a large increase in the delay when relaying is used.
Moreover, higher traffic adds more delay on packets, as noticed when the traffic
reaches 1,200 kbps. This increase in the delay is due to queuing that takes place
in the routers and the relay server.
Figure 5.15 shows the increase of end-to-end delay due to the use of relay. The
increase is computed as (DelayRelay − DelayDirect). It is seen that the absolute
increase in the delay is higher when traffic is high. Furthermore, looking at the
relative increase of the end-to-end delay, computed as
(DelayRelay−DelayDirect)
DelayDirect
and
shown in figure 5.16, we see that relaying doubles the delay. This is the expected
behavior as explained earlier. Moreover, higher traffic causes a larger increase in
127
Figure 5.15: Increase in End-to-end delay for P2P network (logarithmic scale)
the delay, as the relative increase reaches 115% when the traffic is 1,200 kbps.
The reason is that the transmission queue at the relay server is occupied by the
traffic of both sides at the same time, since the relay carries traffic for both peers.
This causes higher queuing delay, which increases the end-to-end delay as shown
in the figure.
5.5.3 Simulation of Traffic Bandwidth
Relaying requires high bandwidth because the relay server carries the traffic for
both directions. Therefore, it is expected that the amount of traffic transmitted
on the relay’s link is double the one transmitted by a peer. The relaying scenario is
simulated, and the traffic throughput is measured at the relay’s link that connects
it to the Internet, and at the peer’s link that connects the LAN router to the
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Figure 5.16: Relative increase in End-to-end delay for P2P network
Internet.
Figure 5.17 shows the amount of measured traffic at both links, the peer’s and
the relay server’s. It is noticed that the relay transmits higher traffic than the
peers, since it is carrying the traffic in both directions. The relative difference
between the throughput of relay and peer is shown in figure 5.18. All scenarios
experience an increase of about 100%, which is expected as the relay carries double
the traffic.
5.5.4 Conclusion
The simulation results show that end-to-end delay is highly affected by the
use of a relay. End-to-end delay suffers an increase of more than 100%, specially
when the traffic is high. In terms of bandwidth, the relay server requires at least
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Figure 5.17: Throughput of P2P network with relaying
Figure 5.18: Relative difference between relay’s throughput and peer’s throughput
130
twice the bandwidth, since the relay server carries twice the amount of traffic sent
by peers.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
In this chapter, the complete solution for Internet denial is discussed, together
with some design, implementation and performance considerations and recommen-
dations. An example scenario of Internet denial in Saudi Arabia is also discussed
to illustrate how the solution can be applied.
6.1 Overview of the NAT-Based Solution
6.1.1 Comparison of Different Solutions for Internet De-
nial
In chapter 2.3.4, a number of solutions for Internet denial were introduced.
The proposed NAT solution has the lowest overhead in terms of performance and
required modifications of the network. BGP Tuning techniques require coopera-
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tion of other ISPs, and do not provide a way of sending traffic to hosts within the
malicious ISP. Tunneling and anonymous routing introduce large overhead that
impacts the network performance. They do not allow contacting hosts within the
malicious ISP.
The NAT solution has very low overhead, which takes place as extra processing
delay at the NAT router. NAT also allows the hosts to contact all other hosts
on the Internet, including the ones within the malicious network. Hence, the
NAT solution can be considered as one of the most efficient solutions in terms of
performance and connectivity.
6.1.2 Design Recommendations
NAT translates all private IP addresses into a smaller set of public IP addresses.
It could translate traffic from a large network into a single IP address. However,
more IP addresses are needed to overcome limitations such as the number of
mappable ports.
The proposed NAT solution does not require extra resources other than the
NAT routers at the gateway level. Bandwidth, for example, is hardly affected
when NAT is enabled. Therefore, the existing network bandwidth should be
sufficient when the solution is deployed. Nevertheless, the design can be scalable,
as discussed earlier in section 3.3.4. These scalability designs can be used by the
entire blocked network, or by subnetworks of it.
Similarly, the proposed solutions for servers can be scaled for larger networks.
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In the proposed HTTP solution, two methods for scalability and load-balancing
are presented earlier: using multiple web switches, and using DNS for load bal-
ancing. Therefore, the NAT routers are not the bottleneck of incoming traffic
anymore, as more routers and web switches can be added to handle a larger
amount of requests.
6.1.3 Performance Considerations
In terms of performance, the NAT solution has a lower performance impact
than other solutions. The maximum effect measured through the simulations does
not exceed an increase of 0.4% for the end-to-end delay, and a decrease of 0.3%
for the traffic throughput, except for the p2p applications when relaying is used.
Moreover, these values are measured for very high NAT delay values. Actual NAT
routers can perform faster processing than the simulated one. Therefore, the effect
of NAT in real networks is negligibly small.
Similarly, the proposed solutions for HTTP and SMTP servers have also low
impact on the network. The solution for HTTP servers adds a small overhead to
the first packet of each request. The remaining packets only experience NAT-like
processing delay. Therefore, the results of simulating this solution were very close
to the ones that were measured in the NAT simulation. The SMTP solution, on
the other hand, adds an intermediate layer of email relaying. The delivery of email
messages are not as time–critical as other applications. The time for a message to
be delivered from the external server to the email relay is not changed. However,
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the message must be sent again from the relay to the actual server. This may
add some delay for the end-to-end delivery. Nevertheless, this delay is not very
critical for an application like SMTP.
Peer-to-peer connectivity is highly affected by NAT. Peers who used to have
direct connections are now forced to use NAT traversal protocols in order to
establish connections. As discussed earlier, the performance overhead of most
NAT traversal protocols is limited to the setup time. However, relaying is the
only technique that has a large effect on performance. Simulations have shown
that the relay server requires double the bandwidth that peers use in order to be
able to deliver traffic between them. End-to-end connectivity is also increased by
at least 100% when a relay server is used. The impact of relaying is very high, but
as it is the only NAT traversal solution that would work with all possible NAT
types and topologies, some peers may have to use it regardless of its performance
issues.
6.1.4 Solution Limitations
The NAT solution for Internet denial has some limitations in terms of con-
nectivity and durability. NAT limits end-to-end connectivity, causing services
and some p2p applications to be unaccessible. We have proposed solutions for
Web and Email servers, but other services within the private network are still
unaccessible.
Peer-to-peer applications that do not support NAT traversal protocols may
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not work correctly behind NAT. Moreover, the Internet denial solution adds a
second layer of NAT. Hence, even if the applications support NAT traversal, some
of them may only work with single–NAT scenarios, but not multi–NAT.
The proposed solution uses identity hiding to bypass the Malicious ISP that
is blocking the traffic. The IP addresses that are used in the NAT solution may
be borrowed from another network. If the malicious ISP detected that these IP
addresses are being used by the blocked network, it would block them too. This
would require replacing the IP addresses with new ones. Therefore, the NAT solu-
tion would only work if the IP addresses are kept hidden from the malicious ISP.
This is possible when the private network consists of only clients, but no servers.
The provided solutions for servers behind NAT expose the new IP addresses in
the DNS, allowing the malicious ISP to detect that these IP addresses are being
used by the blocked network, and to block them eventually.
6.2 Case Study: Internet Denial in Saudi Arabia
In this section, we will look into a hypothetical scenario where a number of
higher-tier ISPs perform Internet denial on the network in Saudi Arabia. The
design and deployment issues of implementing the proposed solution are discussed.
6.2.1 Internet Structure in Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is connected to the Internet through a number of international
ISPs. The network inside Saudi Arabia consists of two layers of ISPs: Data
136
Figure 6.1: Internet structure in Saudi Arabia
service providers (DSPs), and local Internet service providers (local ISPs). DSPs
are connected directly to the international ISPs through a number of physical
links. On the other hand, local ISPs provide Internet services to end users, and
are connected to one or more DSPs to access the Internet. The structure of
Internet in Saudi Arabia is shown in figure 6.1.
6.2.2 Internet Denial
The Internet denial scenario that we assume is performed by one or more
international high-tier malicious ISPs. The malicious ISPs could be connected
directly to the Saudi DSPs, or they could be part of some AS paths that carry
the traffic to the destinations.
We assume that the malicious ISPs will block the IP addresses that belong to
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all service providers in Saudi Arabia. Hence, the traffic sent from any client in
Saudi Arabia will be dropped when it reaches the malicious ISP.
6.2.3 Deployment of NAT Solution in Saudi Arabia
In order to implement the Internet denial solution, one or more non-blocked
IP addresses must be available in order to use them as public IP addresses for the
NAT routers. These IP addresses could be bought from a neighboring network or
country.
NAT routers can be set at the gateway level, i.e., at the links that connect
DSPs to the International ISPs. Because NAT does not have any significant
impact on the performance, additional links or resources are not needed. The
NAT routers could be deployed at the existing links without the need to increase
the bandwidth or to add hardware.
Scalability issues, as discussed earlier, can be resolved by using pools of public
IP addresses at the routers, and increasing the number of NAT routers that are
connected. These solutions would resolve any limitations that are caused by the
lack of memory, bandwidth, or processing power.
The IP addresses within the network should not be changed. The addressing
system should be kept the same. This has two advantages: it prevents any address
conflicts with the NAT routers that already exist in the network, and it keeps the
transition to the NAT solution transparent from the end users. NAT routers
should be configured to treat the IP address blocks within the network as private
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IP addresses.
Users now can access the Internet through the NAT routers as clients, and the
malicious ISPs would route the packets normally because of the hidden identity.
In order to allow clients on the Internet to access services within Saudi Arabia,
the proposed solutions for servers should be implemented as well. The solution for
HTTP servers requires the addition of web switches in order to handle incoming
requests. In the earlier discussions of the solution’s design in chapter 3.5, we have
seen that web switches can be separated from the NAT routers. Hence, incoming
connections are separated from outgoing ones.
Similarly, the solution for SMTP servers is needed to allow external email
servers to deliver messages to the SMTP servers within Saudi Arabia. The solution
requires the use of one or more SMTP relay servers that are used as the mail
exchanges for all mail services within Saudi Arabia.
It is important to separate the used IP addresses for the servers and the clients.
In order to achieve higher durability of the solution, the IP addresses that are
used for the servers should be different than the ones that are used for the clients
outgoing connections. This decreases the probability that the malicious ISPs will
detect that the blocked network is using different IP addresses.
The domain names for all the servers within Saudi Arabia should be updated
in the external DNS servers with the new public IP addresses. Internal DNS
servers, on the other hand, do not require any changes as the internal structure
and addressing of the network are not changed.
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Finally, p2p applications that are used by clients within Saudi Arabia must
support one or more NAT traversal protocols in order to work correctly. The
earlier analysis of NAT traversal protocols have shown that most techniques can
actually work with the dual–NAT problem, but some of them require modifications
in order to handle this scenario. Therefore, few p2p applications may not work
correctly with this solution. However, most existing p2p applications implement
NAT traversal protocols, such as hole–punching and relaying, that would work
properly with this scenario.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This chapter concludes the thesis by outlining the contributions achieved.
Moreover, it discusses some of the open problems for future work.
7.1 Summary of the Contributions
In this thesis, the following has been achieved:
1. A NAT-based solution to the Internet denial problem is designed and eval-
uated.
2. Techniques for HTTP and SMTP servers reachability behind NAT are pro-
posed and evaluated.
3. Different NAT traversal techniques for peer-to-peer applications are evalu-
ated in terms of performance and connectivity.
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7.2 Future Work
Many issues in the Internet denial problem are open for further research. Some
of the issues are:
 Detection of Internet denial: The detection process is important to
find out whether traffic blackholing is taking place, which ISP is performing
it, and whether it is for all generated traffic, or only for a specific type of
packets. The challenge of this process is to distinguish whether the dropping
of packets is caused by routing–level Internet denial; by other malicious
causes, such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks; or by non-malicious reasons,
like network congestion, server unavailability, or connection time-outs.
 Server reachability behind NAT: In this thesis, we resolved the servers-
behind-NAT problem for Web and E-Mail servers. Solutions for other types
of services, such as FTP, VPN, Telnet, etc. are needed.
 Subsequent Internet denial of ISPs: We assumed that the malicious
ISP will block the original set of IP addresses, and it will not block any
subsequently used IP addresses. This assumption depends heavily on the
behavior and motivation of the malicious ISP, as it may put some effort in
tracking the new IP addresses and block them. The proposed solution may
not withstand such actions. Therefore, more investigation is needed in this
area.
 P2P connectivity behind NAT: The qualitative study of the existing
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NAT traversal techniques and protocols shows that many of these tech-
niques do not function correctly with multi–NAT scenarios. Some of these
techniques require modifications in order to achieve connectivity, while other
simply do not work with such scenarios. Better NAT traversal solutions are
needed to enable p2p connectivity behind multi–level NAT.
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